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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
J. M. WEBB, and 1 
SPENCER WEBB, Plaintiffs 
vs. 
MARGARET WEBB and ~ MARGARET WEBB, as No. 7,208 ADMINISTRATRIX OF 
THE ESTATE OF 
WILMER WEBB, Deceased, 
Defendants. J 
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STATEMEN1T OF FACTS 
This is a joint and several appeal by the de-
fendants, Margaret Webb as the widow of Wil-
mer Webb, deceased, and Margaret Webb, as 
administratrix of the estate of Wilmer Webb, 
deceased. Except where otherwise noted the 
brief will be made as lo both jointly and several-
ly. 
This appeal is from the following: 
(1) The refusal of the court to grant a jury 
trial. 
(2) The refusal of the court to admit cer-
tain testimony. 
(3) The erroneous admission of testimony 
by the court. 
( 4) The findings of fact and parts thereof 
as is set out in the statement of errors. 
(5) The conclusions of law as is set out in 
the statement of errors. 
(6) The decree and the. whole thereof ad-
judicating title in the plaintiffs as set out in the 
statement of errors. 
(7) The failure or refusal of the Court to 
find and deere that the defendant widow and 
administratrix was entitled to the possession of . 
property of Wilmer Webb not in the partnership 
described in defendants' counterclaims. 
(8) The refusal of the Court to require the 
surviving partners to account herein to the said 
administratrix. 
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2 
(9) The failure to hold that the deed and 
bill of sale, and each of them, were made with-
out consideration and were only of force and 
effect to entitle plaintiffs to repayment of the 
moneys paid out for the expenses of Wilmer 
Webb's last illness and his funeral expenses. 
( 10) The findings and decree of the Court 
that Margaret Webb signed the deed with full 
knowledge and advice, that she accepted the 
$500 check as a consideration and transfer of 
her rights in the property therein described. 
( 11) The failure of the Court to find said 
widow was a creditor of the estate of Wilmer 
Webb, and entitled out of his personal property 
included in the bill of sale to a reasonable family 
allowance, both before his death and after. 
(12) The failure of the Court to hold the 
widow of Wilmer Webb was entitled to a statu-
tory one-third right, title and interest in the real 
property of Wilmer Webb. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiffs in this action are two brothers, 
J. M. Webb, sometimes known as "Jack," 
"John" and "Johnny," and Spencer Webb. 
There are two defendants, Margaret Webb as 
the widow of Wilmer Webb, deceased, and also 
as the administratrix of his estate. Wilmer 
Webb was the brother of the plaintiffs. He was 
also known as Wilmer E. Webb, Willmer and as 
"Tick." All the parties lived at Deseret Millard 
' County, Utah. 
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AS TO THE PLEADINGS: 
To better understand the nature of the issues 
and defenses herein, we give the substance 
thereof or quote the pleadings. 
Plaintiffs brought this action to quiet title 
to certain real estate located in Millard County, 
Utah, and in the complaint joined without 
separately stating an action to quiet title to cer-
tain personal property. The complaint alleged 
an action to quiet title which was pleaded in the 
usual short form. Coupled with this cause with-
out separately stating it is an action to evict the 
defendant Margaret Webb from the home of 
Wilmer Webb, deceased. 
The property described in plaintiff's com-
plaint is as follows: 
PARCEL A. All of Lots 3 and 4, Block 17, Plat 
"A," Deseret Town Survey, being part of Section 5, 
Township 18 South of Range 7 West, S.L.M. (home 
place of Wilmer Webb and Margaret Webb). 
PARCEL B. The West ~ of N.W. 1/4 of S.W. % 
of Sec. 4, Township 18 South, Range 7 West, S.L.M. 
cont. 20 acres. (Wilmer's South Twenty). 
PARCEL C. The West % of N.E. 1/4 of S.W. 1j4 
and the East V2 of N.W.% of S.W.% of Sec. 4, Town-
ship 18 So., R. 7 West, S.L.M.; 40 acres. 
PARCEL D. Lot 4 (being the Northwest 1/4 of the 
Northwest 1/4) and the S.W. V4 of the N.W. }1i of Sec. 
4; Lots 1 and 2 (being the North 112 of the N.E. 1/4 ), 
the South ~ of the N.E. %, the North 112 of the S.E. 
1/4, the S.W. V4 of the S.E. }1i, all in Section 5, Town-
ship 18 South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Meridian. 
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4 
Together with all water rights of whatsoever kind 
and nature, or howsoever evidenced, used for the irri-
gation of said lands, or any part thereof. 
Together with the following described personalty 
and chattels used with and in connection with the farm-
ing operations of the, above described premises and situ-
ated thereon or in close proximity therewith, to-wit: 
9 ewes and lambs; 
12 head dry ewes; 
1 buck; 
4 milk cows-not branded; 
3 calves-milk strain; 
1 Hereford bull branded -- left ribs; 
13 head Hereford cows and calves branded 
left ribs; 
3 work horses; 
1 saddle horse and saddle; 
1 pig. 
Also an interest and equity in machinery and equip-
mente on the said premises and heretofore owned by 
Webb Brothers, heretofore consisting of the plaintiffs 
herein and the said Wilmer Webb, now deceased. 
One Chev. 6 Sedan Automobile; 1938 Model; 
Serial No. 6HA05 21399; Motor No. 1720 110. 
(R. 4-5) 
ADMINISTRATRIX'S COUNTERCLAIM: 
The defendant· Margaret Webb as widow of 
Wilmer Webb and defendant Margaret Webb as 
administratrix of the estate of Wilmer Webb, 
deceased, filed separate answers and counter-
claims. 
As administr~trix Margaret Webb by separ-
ate answer admitted the allegations of her ap· 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
pointment and qualification as adn1inistratrix, 
and joined issue with the plaintiffs upon all the 
other material allegations of the complaint. In 
addition she, as such administratrix, set out her 
affirmative defense and counterclaim, therein 
alleging that Wilmer E. Webb died intestate on 
the 4th day of July, 1946; that he was a resident 
of Millard County, Utah, at the time of his 
death, and as said administratrix further there-
in alleged: 
II-That Margaret Webb is the surviving widow 
of Wilmer E. Webb, deceased; that from on or about, 
the 21st day of July, 1945, to July 4, 1946, said Wilmer 
Webb stood in the relation of loco parentis to the three 
children of Margaret Webb; and that the estate of Wil-
mer E. Webb is charged with the duty of care, support, 
and maintenance of said widow and said children dur-
ing his lifetime and for a reasonable time following the 
death of said decedent. 
III-That on and between the 21st day of July, 
1945, and the 4th day of July, 1946, the decedent, Wil-
mer E. Webb, was the owner of and, together with the 
defendant herein as his wife, during said time was in 
possession of the following described property in Millard 
County, Utah, to-wit: 
(Parcel A above) 
That thereon was and is situated the home of the 
said Wilmer E. Webb and of Margaret Webb, his 
widow. That at all times herein mentioned since the 
commencement of the above entitled action the defend-
ant, Margaret Webb, has been and now is in possession 
of said property and claims the same as a widow's home-
stead under said Wilmer E. Webb, deceased, for herself 
and said three minor children. 
IV-That defendant is informed and believes, and-
therefore alleges the facts to be . that for many years 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
prior to March 18, 1946, the plaintiffs and Wilmer E. 
Webb, deceased, were partners in the farming and live-
stock business; and that at all times herein mentioned 
prior to March 18, 1946, said partnership was in pos-
session of the following described property located in 
Millard County, Utah, to-wit: 
Parcel 1-Parcel D above, and in addition: the 
S.E. ~ of the S.W. % of Sec. 5, Township 18 South, 
Range 6 West, Salt Lake Meridian. Containing --
acres. 
Parcel 2 (hereinafter called Parcel "E"). The East 
1/2 of the East ,0 of the N.W. % of Sec. 8, Township 
18 South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Meridian. Contain-
ing 40 acres. 
Parcel 3-The same as Parcel "C" above. Con-
taining 40 acres. 
That Pa1'cels 1 and 2 aforesaid during said times 
were owned in an undivided one-third interest by each 
of J. M. Webb, Spencer Webb, and Wilmer E. Webb; 
but the possession and use thereof was in the partner-
ship, and the income therefrom belonged to the partner-
ship. That Parcel 3 aforesaid was owned by the said 
three brothers, John M. Webb, Spencer Webb, and 
Wilmer E. Webb, each an undivided one-third interest 
therein, but stood in the name of Webb Brothers; and 
that the use thereof and the crops therefrom were the 
property of the partnership. 
V.-That on or about the 15th day of March, 
1946, the decedent Wilmer Webb, was in need of 
monies with which to pay for his protracted illness, doc-
tor bills, hospital bills, and monies for the maintenance 
of his family. That on or about said date said decedent 
and the defendant herein made and executed to the 
plaintiffs a certain deed covering all of the above de-
scribed lands, together with water rights of whatsoever 
kind and nature or however evidenced, used for the irri-
gation of said land, or any part thereof; and as a mort-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding f r digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
gage and without any other consideration than as a 
mortgage, the same was delivered to the plaintiffs to 
secure the sums to be advanced for and on behalf of 
said Wilmer Webb and defendant, Margaret Webb. 
VI.-That as defendant is informed and believes 
and therefore alleges the facts to be said Wilmer Webb 
was to further secure the payment of monies advanced 
by the plaintiffs and for monies to be advanced for the 
benefit of Wilmer Webb and defendant, Margaret 
Webb, on or about March 18, 1946, executed to said 
plaintiffs a bill of sale on all the property described, the 
description of which is made in paragraph 2 of plain-
tiffs' complaint which is made a part hereof by refer-
ence. And that pursuant thereto the plaintiffs did ad-
vance and pay out for the expenses of last illness, 
funeral expenses, and for the use and benefit of the 
defendant, Margaret Webb, (decedent, Wilmer Webb) 
approximately $2000.00. 
VII.-That on or about the 15th day of March, 
A. D. 1946, by the mutual consent of the plaintiffs and 
Wilmer Webb, said partnership herein referred to was 
dissolved. That in addition to the income and the crops 
from the above described lands as a part of the partner-
ship assets said partnership on or about March 18, 1946, 
owned the following property: 
1 grain grinder 
1 tractor 
1 threshing machine 
1 Chevrolet truck 
mowing machines 
hay rakes 
wagons 
2 harnesses 
1 cement mixer 
1 manure spreader 
and that the same is of a value unknown to the defend-
ant, but on information and belief alleges the facts to 
be that said personal property above listed in this para-
graph was reasonably worth the sum of $3000.00. That 
at said time the plaintiffs promised and agreed to ac-
count for and pay to said Wilmer Webb the propor-
tionate share of all the monies which had been previous-
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ly collected by the plaintiffs, on account of said firm, 
and also to collect the debts due said firm, and to ren-
der from time to time to the defendant on demand full 
statements of the debts due to said firm and the pay-
ments made on account thereof and to pay over to Wil-
mer Webb his full share of the assets of said firm. 
VIII-That as this defendant is informed and be-
lieves and therefore alleges the facts to be, that prior to 
the dissolution of said firm and of winding up the busi-
ness of said firm the plaintiffs collected large sums of 
money being to the sum of $3000.00 more or less, on 
account of the income from the crops from said lands of 
the partnership; and that said plaintiffs have neglected 
and refused and still neglect and refuse to account with 
and pay to this defendant the proportionate share of 
the assets of said partnership so collected/ as aforesaid 
or any part thereof, although often requested by the 
defendant so to do. 
IX.-That this defendant is informed and believes 
and therefore alleges the facts to be that the interest 
of the estate of Wilmer E. Webb in and to the above 
described· property and the partnership assets are of a 
value of approximately .$10,000.00. 
X.-(Omitted). 
FOR A SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
I. This defendant repeats and realleges paragraphs 
1 and 2 of the foregoing first cause of action. 
II. That at the time of the death of Wilmer Webb, 
July 4, 1946, he was the owner of and entitled to the 
possession of the following described property: 
Here is described the same personal property de-
scribed in plaintiffs' complaint, plus the following: 
2 guns, scabbard. 
1 pair field glasses. 
2 watches. 
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miner's flashlight. 
small hand tools. 
4 pigs. 
200 bushels of grain. 
cash from the sale of U. S. Government bonds 
in the denomination of $700.00, to-wit: ap-
proximately $500.00. 
47 shares stock Delta Canal Company, Cert. No. 
2853. 
58 shares of stock in Deseret Irrigation Co., Cert. 
No. 4409. 
Other certificates of stock not known to this 
defendant, and 
Other sundry items of personal property not 
known to this defendant. 
III. That prior to the commencement of this ac-
tion the plaintiffs wrongfully and unlawfully took pos-
session against the will and without the consent of the 
defendant and that prior to the death of Wilmer Webb 
said persons wrongfully maintained the possession of 
said property and claimed the same as their own, and 
have since asserted they were the owners thereof. 
IV. That prior to the commencement of this ac-
tion defendant has demanded of the plaintiffs herein 
that they return the possession of the 'foregoing items 
and that they relinquish their claims to the same against 
this defendant; and that they have declined and refused 
so to do, and assert their ownership thereof. The reas-
onable value of the above named articles taken and re-
tained by the plaintiffs is the sum of $1500.00. 
WHEREFORE DEFENDANT PRAYS: 
1. That the persons named in the first cause of 
action who claim an interest herein be by the court or-
dered to be made parties hereto. 
2. That the Court require the plaintiffs to make 
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an account of all the receipts and disbursements from 
or on account of the partners.hip property described in 
the foregoing answer and counterclaim; and that there-
upon plaintiffs be required to pay over to this defend-
ant any balance found due and owing to Wilmer W~bb 
from said partnership account. 
3. That the Court determine that the deed and 
bill of sale referred to in the foregoing counterclaim 
be determined to be a mortgage or mortgages; that the 
Court find the amount advanced or paid out by the 
plaintiffs which is secured by said mortgage and direct 
the plaintiffs to convey said property described in said 
instruments, and each of them, to this defendant upon 
payment of the indebtedness secured thereby. 
4. That the Court make and enter an order that 
the possession of said property described in both the first 
and second causes of action which is still in existence 
and in control of the plaintiffs be forthwith delivered 
to this defendant. 
5. That the Court make and enter a judgment in 
favor of this defendant and against the plaintiffs, and 
each of them, for the reasonable value of any items of 
personal property converted by them, and that said sum 
be determined by the Court. 
6. For such other and further relief as to the 
Court may seem just and equitable in the premises. 
(R. 20-25) 
This answer and counterclaim of said ad-
ministratrix was filed herein on June 10, 1947. 
The reply thereto was filed July 10, 1947. 
(R. 27-29). 
Said reply further admits Margaret Webb 
is the widow of Wilmer Webb; and her qualifi-
cation as administratrix of his estate; that she 
was in possession of the home of Wilmer Webb. 
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but denied that she 'vas entitled to the posses-
sion thereof. It further admits that at all times 
herein mentioned prior to March 18, 1946, plain-
tiffs and Wilmer Webb were partners in the 
farming and livestock business. It admits that 
the above described real tracts "B," "C," "D" 
and "E" (includes parcels "1," "2" and "3" 
above) were in the possession of said partner-
ship and that the income therefrom belonged to 
said partnership; that the ownership of tracts 
"C" "D" and "E" above of said real estate was 
' one-third in each of said brothers, but it stood 
in the name of said partnership, and the use 
thereof and the crops therefrom were property 
of the partnership (pars. 2, 3, 4, 5, Reply; R. 27). 
In addition it is in part as follows: 
4. Admit the allegations of paragraph 3 of the 
said counterclaim, but deny that the said defandant is 
entitled to the possession of the property described in 
said paragraph either as a widow's homestead or other-
wise. 
5. Admit the allegations of paragraph 4 of said 
counterclaim. -
6. Admit that on or about the 15th day of March, 
1946, the decedent Wilmer Webb made and executed 
and delivered to these plaintiffs the deed referred to in 
paragraph 5 of said counterclaim, and allege that the 
said Margaret Webb likewise made, executed and de-
livered to these plaintiffs said deed; but deny that the 
same was given as a mortgage or that it was delivered 
to the plaintiffs to secure the sums alleged to have been 
advanced for said Wilmer Webb or to secure any other 
sums, and allege upon the contrary that said deed was 
so given by both said Wilmer E. Webb and by said 
Margaret Webb as a conveyance absolute and for a good 
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and valuable consideration. 
8. Admit that the said partnership was by mutual 
consent dissolved and the partnership property mutually 
and amicably divided, but deny each and every other 
allegation in paragraph VII of the said counterclaim set 
forth. 
11. Answering paragraph II of the second cause 
of action set forth in the said counterclaim, these plain-
tiffs deny-that at the time of the death of said Wilmer 
Webb, he was either the owner of or entitled to the 
possession of the property set forth in said paragraph 
and allege upon the contrary that prior to his death he 
conveyed the said property, excepting the guns and a 
pair of field glasses, to these plaintiffs for a good and 
valuable consideration and that ~t the time of the death 
of said Wilmer Webb, these plaintiffs were the owners 
of and entitled to the possession of said property. 
(R. 27-28). 
The reply denies the other material allega-
tions of the counterclaim. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
Margaret Webb individually f i 1 e d an 
amended answer and counterclaeim herein on 
the 2nd day of September, 1947. Therein she 
joins issue with the complaint the same as she 
did as administratrix. 
In addition therein she pleads that she owns 
in her own right an undivided one-third right, 
title, and interest, in and to the real estate and 
water rights in tracts "A" and "B" above de-
scribed, and that she is entitled as the widow of 
Wilmer Webb to be and remain in possession of 
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the home of Wilmer Webb, as her homestead. 
She then pleads: 
2. That said Wilmer Webb was also known as Wil-
mer E. Webb; that he died intestate on or about the 
4th day of July, 1946, at Salt Lake City, Utah, and 
left surviving him the defendant herein Margaret 
Webb, as surviving widow, and as his sole surviving heir 
of his estate up to a value of $25,000.00. 
3. (Same in substance as II of administratrix's 
counterclaim above.) 
4. That on or about the 21st day of July, 1945, 
Wilmer Webb was a man 42 years of age and in appar-
ent good health, that at said time he held out to defend-
ant herein he was the owner of a big modern home in 
Deseret, Utah, and was the owner of and interested in 
about 500 acres of land in the vicinity of Deseret, Utah, 
in part which he pointed out to defendant; and at said 
time he was in possession of and the owner of the fol-
lowing described lands in Millard County, Utah, to-wit: 
A. (Parcel A. above, described here.) 
(Parcel B. above, described here.) 
B. Together with an undivided one-third right, 
title and interest in and to the following described prop-
erty, located in Millard County, Utah, and described as 
follows: 
(Parcel "D" above described here) · anq_ also 
the Southeast quarter of S.W. V4 of Sec. 5, 
Twp. 18 S. R. 6 W. SLM, containing--
acres. 
(Parcel "C" and "E" above, described here.) 
Together with 59 shares of the Deseret Irriga-
tion Company, 
Together with -- shares of the Milville Irri-
gation Company, 
Together with 47 shares of the Delta Canal 
Company, represented by Certificate No. 2853. 
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C. Together with the following described personal 
property: . 
(Here is described same ~e~sonal!Y, as Is de-
scribed in par. II of admmtstratnx s Second 
Cause of Action above) , 
and less: 
grain, cash from U. S. Bonds, and certificates of 
water stock therein described. 
Plus :-40 head of ewes; 30 head of Hereford 
cows and calves branded left ribs. 
·n. Together with an undivided one-third interest 
in the partnership of the partnership of Webb Brothers 
and that some of said property is described as follows: 
(Same personalty here described as set out in 
paragraph VII of administratrix's counterclaim.) 
E. And other property unknown to this defendant. 
5. That from the 15th day of March, 1946, up to 
and including the 4th day of July, 1946, Wilmer Webb, 
the husband of defendant herein was the owner in fee 
simple of the above described real estate, and interests 
therein, and by and through the defendant herein from 
the 1st part of February, 1946, to July 4, 1946, said 
Wilmer Webb was in possession of the. first above de-
scribed tract of land, to-wit: Lots 3 and 4, Block 17, 
Plat A, Deseret Town Suryey, as the home of said Wil-
mer Webb and the home of the defendant and her chil-
dren; and by and through the plaintiff herein during 
said time, March 15, 1946, to July 4, 1946, Wilmer 
Webb was in possession of the other property above de-
scribed. That the defendant is informed and believes · 
and therefore alleges the facts to be that the property of 
Wilmer Webb at the time of his death was reasonably 
worth the sum of thirty thousand dollars ($30,000.00); 
that on March 15, 1946, and up to and including the 
time of the death of Wilmer Webb defendant 
did not know the nature or value of her husband's 
property. 
6. That Wilmer E. Webb began ailing in Septem-
ber, 1945, that his ailment continued to grow steadily 
worse until February, 1946; that in March, 1946, he was 
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hospitalized at Salt Lake City, Utah, and remained in 
the hospital at Salt Lake City, Utah, until his death. 
That about March, 1946, plaintiffs were informed 
and believed that the ailment of Wilmer E. Webb 
would be fatal and that he would not recover from the 
same; and that this was not known to the defendant 
until about June, 1946. 
7. That on or about the 15th day of March, 1946, 
an attorney for the plaintiffs and Wilmer Webb called 
at said home of Wilmer Webb and then and there rep-
resented to her that Wilmer Webb had spoken to him 
about a divorce from the defendant; that he was a sick-
er man than he thought and suggested the defendant 
take a settlement of .$500.00; that a deed should be 
made from herself and her husband covering the part-
nership lands and her husband's farming lands to the 
plaintiffs herein; that said deed would make it more 
convenient for plaintiffs to run the business, that it 
would make it easier for plaintiffs to finance the medi-
cal and hospital expenses if herself and husband would 
make the deed; that her husband could get the property 
_ back when he came home, and all that he would need 
t? do would be to repay the plaintiffs their money which 
they had paid out for and on his behalf. That defend-
ant believed said statements to be true and she had a 
right to believe them, and acted thereon. 
8. That on the 15th: day of March, 1946, she was 
in strained financial circumsteances; that then she did 
not know anything about the descriptions of the deed, 
could not tell what they were, and was not advised that 
the above described home place was included therein. 
And then without any separate or independent advice 
and without a payment of a fair COI\Sideration she took 
a $500.00 check of plaintiffs' and signed said deed and 
gave it to said attorney, and then stated she would talk 
it over wtih- her husband. That during the latter part 
of March she obtained independent advice upon said 
matter and discussed it over with Wilmer Webb and 
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thereupon she would not accept the $500.00 check and 
did not cash the same; that she does now hereby tender 
and offers to return said check to the plaintiffs and 
hereby offers to repay the plaintifs out of the Estate of 
Wilmer Webb all of their moneys that have been paid 
out for and account of said Wilmer Webb and his busi-
ness and defendant herein. 
9. That on or about the 15th day of March, A. D. 
1946, the plaintiffs herein with the aid and cooperation 
of said Wilmer Webb procured from this defendant, 
Margaret Webb, and Wilmer Webb, said deed of con-
veyance of the above described lands, thereby vesting 
the apparent legal title to said lands in said plantiffs, 
who caused the same to be recorded in the office of the 
county recorder of Millard County, Utah, on the 25th 
day of March, 1946, Book 27, of deeds, on pages 470-71. 
10. That at the time said deed was executed and 
for a long time prior and subsequent thereto said Wil-
mer Webb was seriously ill with a disease to such an 
extent as to be incapable of transacting his ordinary 
business, and he never intended to the day of his death 
that said conveyance should operate as an absolute 
conveyance of his property; and this defendant. did not 
intend and has not since intended said conveyance as a 
waiver of her statutory one-third interest in s~id proper-
ty. But as defendant is informed and believes and there-
fore alleges the facts to be said deed was procured by 
the plaintiffs with the aid of Wilmer Webb, with the 
intention of cheating and defrauding this defendant out 
of her widow's one-third right, title and interest in and 
to the above described real estate;· and that said deed 
and conveyance was made without any consideration. 
11. Tqe defendant is informed and believes and 
therefore alleges the facts to be that for many years 
prior to July 4, 1946, the plaintiffs and Wilmer E. 
Webb, deceased, were partners in the farm and live-
stock business, that at all times herein mentioned there 
was a partnership existing between the plaintiffs and 
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said Wilmer E. \\'ebb and that at all times herein men-
tioned they stood as to each other in confidential rela-
tions. 
12. That defendant is informed and believes and 
therefore alleges the facts to be on or about March 18, 
1946, said Wilmer E. Webb executed to the plaintiffs 
herein a bill of sale on the· above described personal 
property described in division D and C of paragraph 4 
hereof, with the intention of cheating and defrauding 
this defendant of her right to support and maintenance 
for herself and her children out of his said estate and 
that said transfer was made without any consideration 
and is void against this defendant. 
13. That by virtue of the conveyance designated in 
paragraphs 8, 9, and 12 above, the said Wilmer Webb 
was thereby rendered insolvent and was left without an 
estate. 
14. That by virtue of the said deed and bill of sale 
the plaintiffs are in possession of some of said land and 
personal property of Wilmer Webb, deceased, claiming 
to be the exclusive owners thereof, and they refuse to 
permit the defendant to have any part thereof, or of the 
rents and profits therefrom. That in equity defendant 
is the owner of a statutory one-third right, title, and in-
terest in and to said real estate above described and in 
equity is the owner as an heir of Wilmer Webb of the 
first .$25,000.00 in value of said estate, subject to the 
debt to the plaintiffs above referred, and subject to the 
expenses of administration and to the debt of mainten-
ance and support of the defendant and her children and 
subject to being probated in the matter of the estate of 
Wilmer E. Webb, deceased. 
For a Second Affirmative Defense and 
Count this defendant alleges: 
1. Defendant repeats and reallages by reference 
the allegations of the foregoing paragraphs of the Affir-
mative Defense and Counterclaim numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 
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5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 of the foregoing counter-
claim. 
2. That Wilmer Webb up to the time of his death 
held out to this defendant that he loved, cherished her, 
and asked her not to leave his home in Deseret but to 
stay there for his comfort and to care for him upon his 
return from the hospital. That notwithstanding said 
representations of love, affection and care for this de-
fendant, which plaintiffs well knew, said Wilmer Webb 
and the plaintiffs herein counselled together to defraud 
this defendant of her statutory one-third right in Wilmer 
Webb's property; to defraud her of any inheritance 
from Wilmer Webb and his estate; to defraud her of 
her ho~estead in Wilmer Webb's property and to de-
fraud her of her right to support and maintenance of 
herself and minor children from the estate of Wilmer 
Webb. 
3. That pursuant thereto on or about the 9th day 
of March, 1946, they represented to this defendant that 
they wished the possession of deeds to the real property 
for the purpose of making the m0rtgage upon the home 
place of the parties to obtain money with which to pay 
doctor and hospital expenses of Wilmer Webb; and 
that on the 15th day of March, 1946, they represented 
to her that the deed was made for a matter of con-
venience in the operation of the partnership·business of 
plaintiffs and Wilmer Webb, and as security for the ad-
vancement of moneys to pay for Wilmer Webb's hospital 
and medical bills. That plaintiff relied upon said rep-
resentations as true, and had a right to rely thereon, 
and that under said representations plaintiffs obtaiped 
possession of the deeds, stocks and bonds of Wilmer 
Webb, deceased. That thereby on the 15th day of 
March they obtained from defendant her signature of 
the above referred to deed and Wilmer Webb executed 
the above referred to deed and bill of sale to the plain-
tiffs on the 18th day of March, 1946, all with the in-
tent to hinder and defraud the;: defendant herein and 
~ 
J 
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prevent her from securing her statutory one-third right, 
title and interest in said real property, and thus to pre-
vent her from securing her homestead in Wilmer Webb's 
property, and thus to prevent her from securing care, 
and support of herself and minor children from said 
property. That the said representations in this para-
graph set out, if the claims of the plaintiffs are true as 
set out in their complaint are false and fraudulent as to 
this defendant; and that thereby she will suffer great 
loss and damage for which she has no plain, or speedy 
remedy adequate at law. 
For a Third Affirmative Defense and Count 
this Defendant Alleges: 
1. Defendant repeats and realleges by reference 
the allegations of the foregoing paragraphs of the Affir-
mative Defense and Counterclaim numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 
5, and 6. 
2. That ever since the 15th day of March, 1946, 
the defendant herein, Margaret Webb, has been and 
now is in possession of the following described property, 
claimed by the plaintiffs, located in Millard County, 
Utah, and described as follows : 
All of Lots Three ( 3) and Four ( 4) Block 
Seventen ( 17), Plat "A," Deseret Survey, 
being part of Section Five ( 5), Township 
Eighteen (18) South, Range Seven (7) West, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
1 1938 Chevrolet Sedan, Serial No. 6H005-
21399, Motor No. 1720-110. 
That the real estate described in this paragraph is 
the home place of defendant and is hereby claimed as a 
widow's homestead by defendant as a widow of Wilmer 
Webb, deceased, for herself and her minor children, and 
that the reasonable value thereof is unknown to· this 
defendant, but upon information alleges it to be of a 
value of $6,000.00. 
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WHEREFORE THIS DEFENDANT PRAYS: 
1. That the deed above referred .to from Wilmer 
Webb and defendant herein to the plaintiffs herein be 
cancelled and set aside, both as to this defendant's sig-
nature thereto and Wilmer Webb's execution thereof. 
2. That the bill of sale above referred to from 
Wilmer Webb, deceased, to the plaintiffs herein be can-
celled and set aside. ' 
3. That if said in~truments are not vacated and 
set aside that said deed and bill of sale, and each of 
them, be held to be a mortgage or mortgages upon the 
property therein described from Wilmer Webb and de-
fendant herein to the plaintiffs to secure their moneys 
which they paid out for the use and benefit of Wilmer 
Webb and this defendant; and that they be directed to 
reconvey said property to defendant herein as adminis-
tratrix of the estate of Wilmer Webb, deceased; and to 
deliver possession thereof to this defendant as said ad-
ministratrix. 
4. That it be adjudged and decreed by the Court 
that the plaintiffs, and each of them, have no right, 
title or interest in the property described in paragraph 
4 of the defendant's counterclaim except as mortgagee 
and heirs to a value of over $25,000.00; and that the 
defendant's claims thereto against the adverse claims of 
the plaintiffs, and each of them, and all persons claim-
ing by, through and under them, be quieted and that 
this defendant have judgment for restitution of the 
premises subject to the payment of debts and the pro-
bate thereof. 
5. For such other and further relief as to the Court 
may seem just and equitable in the premises. (R. 35-43). 
REPLY: 
To said pleading the plaintiffs made the 
I 
t 
I 
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same reply as to the counterclaims of Marga-
ret Webb, administratrix, and further replied: 
That they admitted the allegations of para-
graphs 2 and 3 above, except they denied Wil-
mer Webb stood in the relation to said children 
as a parent. They denied most of the material 
allegations above, except as they specifically 
pleaded: 
5. Admit that said Wilmer Webb was a man of 
about 42 years of age on or about the 21st day of July, 
1945; admit that at said time he was the owner of the 
premises substantially as set forth in paragraph 4 of 
said alleged counterclaim, and at said time he owned 
59 shares of Deseret Irrigation Company water stock 
and 47 shares of Delta Canal Company stock, being 
water rights represented by certificates of stock in in-
corporated irrigation companies; that concerning the 
personal property described in said paragraphs plaintiffs 
admit that said Wilmer Webb, prior to on or about 
March 15, 1946, owned such personal property as is 
described more fully in plaintiffs' complaint on file 
herein, and deny that he was the owner of any personal 
property- set forth in paragraph 4 of said alleged coun-
terclaim other or different than or in addition to the 
personal property described in said paragraph 4 of al-
leged counterclaim; deny each and every allegation in 
said paragraph set forth excepting as herein otherwise 
admitted or qualified. 
7. Admit the allegations of paragraph 6 of said 
alleged counterclaim; excepting that plaintiffs deny that 
in February, 1946, they were informed or believed that 
the ailment of Wilmer E. Webb would be fatal, and 
allege upon the contrary that until a few days prior to 
his death they did not know how long he would live, 
but had been informed and believed that he would 
always thereafter be an invalid but might live for a 
number of years. 
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8. Deny that on or about the 15th day of March, 
1946, or at any other time or at all, an attorney for the 
plaintiffs contacted said defendant; admit that an attor-
ney for Wilmer Webb called upon said defendant and 
discussed a property settlement between said defendant 
and Wilmer Webb; deny each and every other allega-
tion contained in paragraph 7 of said alleged counter-
claim. 
9. Deny each and every allegation contained in 
paragraph 8 of said alleged counterclaim, excepting that 
plaintiffs admit the said defendant did not cash said 
check for $500.00. 
12. Admit that for many years prior to July 4th, 
1946, the said Wilmer E. Webb and plaintiffs were part-
ners in a farming business and operation; and allege 
that said parties for some years prior to March 15th, 
1946, or thereabouts, ran some livestock in common, but 
not as partners; and deny each and every other allega-
tion contained in paragraph 11 of said alleged counter-
claim. 
13. Admit that on or about March 18th, 1946, 
said Wilmer Webb executed to the plaintiff~ a bill of 
sale on certain personal property as set forth and de-
scribed in their complaint on file herein; and deny each 
and every other allegation contained in the paragraph 
No. 12 of said alleged counterclaim. 
15. Admit that plaintiffs are in possession of some 
of said land and personal property by virtue of said 
deed and bill of sale claiming to be owners thereof, 
and admit that they dispute the right or title of said 
defendant to any part thereof; and deny each and every 
other allegation contained in paragraph 14 of said al-
leged counterclaim. 
19. Admit that ever since the 15th day of March, 
1946, the defendant Margaret Webb has been and now 
is in possession of the realty described in paragraph 2 
of the third affirmative defense; deny that she is now 
' l 
J 
1 
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in possession of said automobile; admit that said defend-
ant now claims a widow's homestead in said realty but 
allege that said claim is false and untrue and that she 
parted with any interest or equity in said realty by vir-
tue of said warranty deed executed by her in favor of 
these parties; deny each and every other allegation con-
tained in paragraph 2 of the said third affirmative 
defense. 
Plaintiffs prayed for dismissal of defendant's coun-
terclaims and for relief as in complaint set out. 
(R. 44-47). 
The defendant's request for a trial by jury 
was denied, which will be later treated. After 
trial to the Honorable Will L. Hoyt, sitting as 
Judge of said Court, the Court made the follow-
ing finds of fact, con-clusions of law, and decree: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The findings of fact and conclusions of law 
to which no exceptions have been taken by the 
defendant are as follows: 
From the Findings of Fact: 
1. That the defendant M~ugaret Webb is now 
and has been since on or about the 26th day of August, 
1946, the duly appointed, qualified and acting adminis-
trarix of the estate of Wilmer Webb, deceased. 
2. That the defendant Margaret Webb inter-mar-
ried with the deceased, Wilmer Webb, at Fillmore, in 
Millard County, Utah, on or about the 21st day of July, 
1945, and ever since said date and up to the date of the 
death of said Wilmer Webb, they were husband and 
wife~ 
3. That said Wilmer Webb died intestate on or 
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about the 4th day of July, 1946, at Salt Lake City, 
Utah, and left surviving him the defendant Margaret 
Webb, as surviving widow, and left no issue or descend-
ants. 
4. That at the time of the marriage of the defend-
ant Margaret Webb was the mother of three minor 
children between the ages of nine months as the young-
est and eight years as the eldest; that after the marriage 
of Wilmer Webb and Margaret Webb the children were 
taken into the home of said parties and jointly cared 
for by said parties and were supported by said Wilmer 
Webb. 
5. That Wilmer Webb began ailing during the 
month of September, 1945, and that his ailment con-
tinued to grow steadily worse until February, 1946; 
that in March, 1946, he was hospitalized at Salt Lake 
City, Utah, and remained in the hospiteal at Salt Lake 
City, Utah, until his death on or about the 4th day of 
July, 1946 ..... . 
11. That said Margaret Webb has continued to 
and now does occupy the home and has continued to 
use the automobile until about June of 1947, when 
plaintiffs repossessed the same by legal action. 
15 ... that the reasonable market value of the per-
sonal property . . . conveyed by Wilmer Webb to the 
plaintiffs is $4671.00, including approximately $575.00 
as the value of war savings bonds. 
19. That it was stipulated in open court by coun-
sel for the plaintiffs and counsel for the defendants that 
the defendant Margaret Webb, as administratrix of the 
estate of Wilmer Webb, deceased, was entitled to and 
should have delivered to her one thirty-two caliber 
Special Winchester Rifle and case, one pair of field 
gla~ses and one wrist watch in the event the wrist watch 
is located by either of the plaintiffs, and that there 
should be paid to her as such administratrix the sum 
of .$90.00, being one-third of the value of one hundred 
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bushels of grain, an additional sum of $90.00 being the 
equity of Wilmer Webb in $270.00 of partnership assets 
paid to plaintiffs for feed pellets, and the additional 
sum of $141.0 being the equity of Wilmer Webb in 
$423.00 of partnership assets paid to plaintiffs for alfalfa 
seed, and the Court finds, pursuant to the said stiupla-
tion that the foregoing ·property and foregoing sums of 
money are assets of the estate of Wilmer Webb and in 
the posses.sion of said plaintiffs. 
From the Conclusions of Law: 
5. That the following property and money in the 
possession of the plaintiffs belong to and are assets of 
the estate of Wilmer Webb, deceased, and that the de-
fendant, Margaret Webb, as· administratrix of the estate 
of Wilmer Webb, deceased, is entitled to the immediate 
possession thereof, to-wit: 
One thirty-two caliber Special Winchester Rifle 
and case; one pair of field glasses and one wrist watch 
in the event the wrist watch is located by either of the 
plaintiffs, and the sum of $321.00. 
The following are the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law to which exceptions are ta-
ken by plaintiff to-wit: 
From Findings of Fact: 
5 .... that sometime prior to March 14th, 1946, the 
plaintiffs and defendant Margaret Webb knew that 
said Wilmer Webb was seriously ill, and on March 
15th, 1946, when Margaret Webb executed the deed 
hereinafter mentioned, she knew that Wilmer Webb 
was in the hospital and that he might be a permanent 
invalid, and she had reason to believe that his illness 
might be fatal. 
6. That from a time shortly after the marriage 
of the parties until said Wilmer Webb was taken into 
the hospital as aforesaid, he and said Margaret Webb 
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had a number of differences and there was some dis-
cussion between them of a separation and divorce. 
7. That sometime prior to March 14th, 1946, one 
Dudley Crafts, an attorney at law, had a conversation 
with Wilmer Webb at the Holy Cross Hospital at Salt 
Lake City, and that Wilmer Webb discussed with Mr. 
Crafts some arrangement for having his hospital ex-
penses and medical bills taken care of, and that he also 
discussed with Mr. Crafts the marital difficulties that 
had been existing between himself (Wilmer Webb) and 
Margaret Webb; that he requested Mr. Crafts to visit 
said Margaret Webb, who was then residing at Deseret 
in Millard County, Utah, and in the home then owned 
by said Wilmer Webb, to see and determine if Mar-
garet Webb was willing to effect a reconciliation and 
remain at said home permanently as the wife of Wil-
mer Webb and to take care of him when he should 
return home, and if she was unwilling so to do then to 
make some arrangements with the plaintiffs, his broth-
ers, to take care of him during the balance of his life-
.time and pay the expenses incident to his illness and 
provide for him the balance of his lifetime; that there-
after, and on March 15th, 1946, said Crafts visited 
Margaret Webb at Deseret, Utah, and discussed with 
her the matter of reconciliation, and was informed by 
Margaret Webb that a reconciliation was, in her op~: 
ion, not possible; that said Crafts then discussed with 
Margaret Webb a proposal of having the plaintiffs, as 
brothers of said Wilmer Webb, look after Wilmer Webb 
and during the balance of his lifetime pay the hospital 
and medical bills and provide for him the necessary 
and attention required, in consideration of which they 
should receive a deed to his real estate and a bill of 
sale to his personal property. 
That Margaret Webb consented to such an arrange-
ment and Mr. Crafts then discussed with her the mat-
ter of some consideration to be given her for relinquish-
ing her interest in the real estate and other property; 
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that Margaret Webb stated to Mr. Crafts that she 
did not want anything excepting the right to occupy the 
said home until shortly after the school term should 
end in May of 1946, and the right to use the car of 
said Wilmer Webb until such time; that Mr. Crafts 
stated that she should have some money with which to 
live and support herself until she should be able to re-
establish herself, and suggested that the plaintiffs pay 
her .$500.00 in cash; that she thereupon stated if Wil-
mer Webb was paying such amount she would not care 
to accept the same, but if it was being paid by the 
plaintiffs she would accept the sum of $500.00 and 
would execute a deed to the real estate of Wilmer 
Webb; that Mr. Crafts then left and prepared a deed 
which is the plaintiffs' exhibit ·1 for conveyance to the 
plainti!fs of the real estate therein described; that short- _ 
ly thereafter Mr. Crafts again visited said Margaret 
Webb and presented the deed for her signature, and 
that she at that time again agreed to execute the deed. 
She carried the deed to the office of a Notary Public 
in Deseret, signed and acknowledged the same and im-
mediately thereafter delivered it to Mr. Crafts and 
accepted a check of the paintiffs for the sum of $500.00. 
That at the time Margaret Webb signed the deed it had 
not been signed by Wilmer Webb, but was executed by 
Wilmer Webb on the 18th day of March, 1946, at the 
hospital in Salt Lake City, Utah, and immediately 
thereafter delivered to the plaintiff Spencer Webb by 
said Wilmer Webb. 
8. That when said deed was executed by Mar-
garet Webb and delivered to Mr. Crafts, she knew it 
covered the real estate described therein, including the 
home of Wilmer Webb; that she knew it was a deed and 
not a mortgage, and she was not laboring under the. 
belief that it was a mortgage or that it was given as 
security for the moneys to be paid by the plaintiffs for 
the care of and for the hospital and medical bills of 
Wilmer Webb, and that she had been fully informed by 
Mr. Crafts of the nature of the instrument. 
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9. That altho said M'argaret Webb had not con-
sulted an attorney before executing said deed and ac-
cepting said check for $500.00, she was well informed as 
to the kind of property and the nature thereof then 
owned by Wilmer Webb and had some idea of its value; 
that she had lived in the house for some months and 
was acquainted with the farming operations carried on 
between Wilmer Webb and his brothers and was sub-
stantially acquainted with the nature and extent of the 
property included in said deed. 
10. That after executing said deed and accepting 
the said check for $500.00, Margaret Webb consulted 
an attorney, and thereafter did not cash said check, but 
that she brought no action to rescind or annual or can-
cel the deed until after the death of Wilmer Webb and 
not until she counterclaimed in the present action. 
12. That on the 18th day of March, 1946, the 
said Wilmer Webb executed and delivered to the plain-
tiff Spencer Webb a bill of sale and being plaintiffs' 
exhibit 2, and at or about the same time delivered to 
said plaintiff Spencer Webb the transfer papers and 
certificate of title to the car, with the intention of trans-
ferring the title thereto to the said plaintiffs. 
13. That the plaintiffs and each of them agreed 
with said Attorney Crafts, who was then and there act-
ing as attorneys for Wilmer Webb, that in consideration 
of the transfer to them by Wilmer Webb of the proper-
ty described in plaintiffs' exhibits 1 and 2, they and 
their wives would take care of and look after Wilmer 
Webb as long as he lived and would pay his hospital 
and medical bills as long as he lived and would also 
pay to Margaret Webb $500.00 for her interest in the 
property; and said plaintiffs did pay the said $500.00 
by delivering their check in her favor and which check 
was received by Margaret Webb. 
14. That pursuant to the agreement between 
plaintiffs and said Wilmer Webb, and with full knowl-
edge and prior consent of said Margaret Webb, all as 
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more particularly in these findings stated, plaintiffs 
have paid all of the expenses in curred by Wilmer Webb 
for hospital, medical and doctor's care, and have paid 
all of his fun!eral expenses, amounting to the sum of 
approximately $17 50.00; and said plaintiffs were ready 
and willing to take care of said Wilmer Webb for the 
balance of his lifetime. 
15. That the reasonable market value of the real-
ty and water rights conveyed by Wilmer Webb to the 
plaintiffs is $8966.00; that the reasonable market value 
of the personal property so conveyed by Wilmer Webb 
to the plaintiffs is $4671.00 ..... 
16. That some war savings bonds were turned 
over to plaintiffs by Wilmer Webb in pursuance of the 
agreement between the plaintiffs and said Wilmer 
Webb, as aforesaid, some of which bonds, were pur-
chased in the name of Wilmer Webb and Spencer 
Webb, and some of which were purchased in the name 
of Wilmer Webb and J. M. Webb, the total value of 
which was approximately $575.00; that the bonds were 
cashed by plaintiffs and used to pay a part of the ex-
penses incurred by Wilmer Webb. 
17. That the plaintiffs did not connive with 'Wil-
mer Webb, nor he with the plaintiffs, to defraud the 
defendant Margaret Webb out of any inheritance to 
which she might be entitled from Wilmer Webb and 
his estate; that said plaintiffs did not obtain poss~ssion 
of said deed and bill of sale and bonds through fraud 
or misrepresentation, and that the said deed and bill of 
sale were executed by Wilmer Webb and Margaret 
Webb for a good and valuable consideration. 
18. That all of the allegations contained in the 
answer and counterclaim of Margaret Webb as admin-
istratrix of the Estate of Wilmer Webb, deceased and 
the allegations contained in the answer and counter-
claim of Margaret Webb as an individual, which are 
adverse to and inconsistent with the foregoing findings, 
are not true. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
30 
20. That since on or about the 18th day of 
March 1946 these plaintiffs have been and now are 
the o~ners ~f and are now entitled to the immediate 
possession of the premises more particularly described 
in paragraph II of their complaint on file herein and 
being the same premises as are described in plaintiffs' 
exhibit 1, together with all water rights of whatsoever 
kind and nature or howsoever evidenced, used for the 
irrigation of said lands and the whole thereof; that since 
on or about the 18th day of March, 1946, these plain-
tiffs have been and now are the owners of and are now 
enti~led to the immediate possession of the personal 
property and chattels more particularly described in 
paragraph II of their complaint on file herein and be-
ing the same personalty as are described in plaintiffs' 
exhibit 2; and that the defendant herein, Margaret 
Webb, and the defendant Margaret Webb as adminis-
tratrix of the estate of Wilmer Webb, decseased, has 
no right, title, interest _or estate therein. 
21. That the partnership existing between the 
plaintiffs and Wilmer Webb prior to the death of said 
Wilmer Webb was dissolved and . terminated by mutual 
agreement between the parties; that no sufficient evi-
dence has been presented to the Court in the trial of the 
within cause to justify the taking of an accounting in 
this cause. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the plaintiffs herein are the owners in fee 
simple absolute of the real property hereinbefore and 
in the complaint in this cause described, together with' 
the water rights appurtenant thereto. 
2. That the plaintiffs are the owners absolute of 
the personal property hereinbefore and in the com-
plaint herein described. 
3. That the plaintiffs are entitled to the immediate 
possession of the said realty, water rights and personal 
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property. 
+. That the plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment 
quieting their title to the said realty, water rights and 
personal property, as prayed for in their complaint, as 
against the defendant Margaret Webb, as an individual 
and as administratrix of the estate of Wilmer Webb, 
deceased, and all persons claiming or to claim the same 
or any part thereof under her in either capacity, and 
declaring and determining that said defendant in either 
capacity, has no right, title, interest, equity or estate 
therein. 
6. That the said defendant is entitled to take 
nothing by reason of her counterclaim as an individ-
ual, or by reason of her counterclaim as administratrix 
of the estate o(Wilmer Webb, deceased, excepting as 
hereinbefore set forth. 
7. That the defendant is not entitled to any ac-
counting upon the evidence as produced in the trial of 
said cause, but the right to an accounting should be at 
this time and in this cause rejected and denied without 
prejudice to the right of defendant to apply for an ac-
counting hereafter, if she be so advised. 
8. That plaintiffs are entitled to their costs of suit 
herein incurred. 
Judgment is hereby ordered to be entered accord-
ingly. 
ingly. (R. 51-8) 
The following is the decree from the whole 
of which defendants except, other than the last 
ten lines of paragraph "5" thereof, to-wit: 
DECREE 
This cause came on regularly for trial before the 
Court sitting without a jury on the 3rd day of Septem-
ber, 1947, and was continued from time to time and 
completed on the 6th day of September, 1947. Messrs. 
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Cline, Wilson and Cline appeared as attorneys for the 
plaintiffs, and Messrs. Jensen and Jensen appeared as 
attorneys for the defendants; and the Court having 
heard the testimony and having examined the proofs 
offered by the respective parties, and the Court being 
fully advised in the premises and having filed herein its 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and having di-
rected that judgment be entered in accordance there-
with-
Now therefore, by reason of the law and findings 
aforesaid: 
It is Hereby Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed: 
1. That the plaintilfs, J. M. Webb and Spencer 
Webb, were at the time of the commencement of this 
action, and now are the owners absolute in fee simple 
of the premises described in the complaint on file herein 
and more particularly hereinafter described, and their 
right and interest in the said premises as such owners 
in fee simple is hereby declared and established. 
2. That the said plaintiffs were at the time of the 
commencement of this action, and now are, the owners 
absolute of the personal property and chattels described 
in the complaint on file herein and more particularly 
hereinafter described, and their right and interest in 
said personal property and chattels is hereby declared 
and established. 
3. That the said defendant, Margaret Webb, as 
an individual, and said defendant, Margaret Webb, as 
administratrix of the estate of Wilmer Webb, deceased, 
and all persons claiming under the said Margaret Webb, 
either in her individual capacity or as such administra-
trix, and each and all of them, be, and they are hereby 
forever barred from any and all claim of right, title or 
interest in and to the said premises and to the said 
personal property and chattels, or any lien thereon, or 
any part thereof. 
4. That the said plaintiffs are entitled to the im-
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mediate possession of the said premises and ~ the said 
personal property and chattels, and are hereby awarded 
the process of this Court to place them in the possession 
thereof. 
5. That the said defendant shall take nothing by 
reason of her counter"claim in this action filed as an 
individual, or by reason of her counterclaeim in this 
action filed as administratrix of the estate of Wilmer 
Webb, deceased, excepting that by stipulation of the 
parties through their respective counsel, made in open 
court, the defendant, Margaret Webb as administratrix 
of the estate of Wilmer Webb, deceased, is entitled to 
and is hereby awarded the possession of one thirty-two 
caliber Special Winchester Rifle and case, one pair of 
field glasses and one wrist watch belonging to Wilmer 
Webb, (in the event the wrist watch is located by either 
of the plaintiffs) together with the sum of $321.00, and 
that said defendant is hereby awarded the process of 
this court, if necessary, to place her in the possession of 
said chattels and for the collection of the said sum of 
money. 
6. That the said defendant either in her capacity 
as an individual or in her capacity as administratrix of 
the estate of Wilmer Webb, deceased, is not entitled in 
this action to an accounting against and from the plain-
tiffs or either of them, but the right to an accounting 
is in this cause hereby rejected and denied without pre-
judice to the right of said defendant to aply in an ap-
propriate action for an accounting hereafter, if she be 
so advised. 
7. That plaintiffs are hereby awarded against the 
said defendant their costs in and about this action ex-
pended, and hereby taxed at the sum of.$.----::..--
That following is a description of the property af-
fected by this decree, the same being situated in the 
County of Millard, State of Utah, and more particularly 
described as follows, to-wit : 
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•(Lands described in plaintiffs' complaint): 
Together with all water rights of whatsoever kind 
and nature or however evidenced, used for the irriga-
tion of said lands, or any part thereof. 
Together with the following described personalty 
and chattels used with and 'in connection with the farm-
ing operations of the above described premises and 
situated thereon or in close proximity therewith, to-wit: 
(Same as described in complaint). 
Also, all other livestock owned by one Wilmer 
Webb, now deceased, or in which he had an equity. on 
March 18th, 1946. 
Also all of the right, title, interest and equity of 
Wilmer Webb, now deceased, in and to all machinery 
and equipment of every kind, nature and description 
owned by Webb Brothers, a co-partnership and hereto-
fore consisting of J. M. Webb, Spencer Webb and said 
Wilmer Webb. 
One Chev. 6 Sedan automobile, 1938 Model -
Serial No.6 Ha 05-21399; Motor No. 1720-110. 
Judgment rendered this 2nd day of February, 1948. 
WILL L. HOYT, 
Judge of the District Court. 
F AC\TS AS TO THE TRIAL: 
On the 16th day of June, 1947, before the is-
sues were joined herein on the motion of the at-
torneys for the plaintiffs the case was set down 
for a non-jury trial on the 15th day of July, 1947 
(it having also previously been set upon the 
same basis). 
The issues herein were first joined on the 
lOth day of July, 1947; and on the 14th day of 
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July, 1947, the defendants sent to the clerk of 
the above district court the jury fee and with it 
a \Vritten request that the case be set for a jury 
trial. 
On the 15th day of July, 1947, in the absence 
of counsel for the defendants, and upon the mo-
tion of counsel for the plaintiffs, the Court di-
rected the clerk to return the jury fee and set 
the case for a non-jury trial on the 3rd day of 
September, A. D. 1947. On the 3rd day of Sep-
tember, 1947, the defendants renewed their re-
quest for a jury trial; which request was denied, 
and exception taken. 
The plaintiffs over the objections of the de-
fendants introduced a deed (Ex. 1) and a Bill 
of Sale (Ex. 2) and then waived their claim to . 
damages against the defendants and rested. ( tr. 
4-10). 
At the outset of the defendants' case de-
mand was made upon the plaintiffs to produce 
the checking account, the record of the bank, of 
the deposits and withdrawals of Webb Brothers, 
conisting of plaintiffs and Wilmer Webb, de-
ceased, of the certificates of irrigation stock, 
and of the checking account of Webb Brothers 
established on or about the 15th of March, 1946, 
together with the records of said partnerships. 
They were so ordered to do. ( tr. 11-12). 
After the conclusion of the trial and before 
the· findings were made, counsel stipulated the 
defendant adminisratrix was entitled to the pos-
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session of the personal property and to receive 
the sum of money set out in finding 19, to-wit: 
thirty-two caliber Special Winchester Rifle and 
case, one pair of field glasses and one wrist 
watch (if found) and to a payment of $321.00. 
It was this gun, the scabard, and another gun 
which disappeared from the house when she was 
away. It was this pair of field glasses that was 
gone when she returned one time; and it was 
this flashlight and the small hand tools which 
disappeared out of the house when she wasn't 
there. After her husband went to the hospital 
about six or seven times every time she came 
back from her mother's she could see where 
somebody had been in the house. One time they 
padlocked Wilmer's trunks. (tr. 46-8). 
FACTS FROM EVIDENCE 
On the 21st day of July, 1945, Wilmer Webb 
was a single man of 42 years of age and in ap-
parent good health. On said date he married 
the defendant herein, Margaret Webb. At that 
time she was the mother of three minor chil-
dren, Allen, Linda and Mary, ages two to nine 
years, inclusive. Said children were then living 
with Margaret Webb. Mter said marriage she 
and said three children lived with their mother 
and Wilmer Webb in his home and were sup-
ported by him until February, 1946, when he 
went to Salt Lake for medical treatment; and 
they continued to live in said home until after 
the trial herein. (tr. 12-15). 
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The family lived happily together until Oc-
tober 1945. 
During the first part of November, 1945, 
John Webb, one of the plaintiffs, complimented 
the defendant on the improved situation of his 
brother Wilmer - the deceased ; and in sub-
stance said that Tick seemed much happier 
after he and the defendant were married, and 
that Tick had improved very much and looked 
much nicer since he was married (tr. 105). 
In September, 1945, Wilmer Webb began to 
complain of pain and distress in his back. 
From September, 1945, Wilmer Webb's ill-
ness gradually grew worse until about the 8th 
day of February, 1946, when it had progressed 
so far that he went to Salt Lake City for treat-
ment, and he did not return thereafter to live in 
his home. In the latter part of October or first 
part of November, 1945, they occupied separate 
bedrooms with mutual consent. From Decem-
ber, 1945, until the 8th day of February, 1946, 
Wilmer Webb from time to time received medi-
cal attention from a doctor. (tr .12-15; 81). 
From February 8, 1946, to about the 8th day 
of March, 1946, he lived at his niece's (Glena's) 
in Salt Lake City (tr. 82, -). About March, 
1946, he entered the Holy Cross Hospital (Ex. 
A.) 
Between February 28, 1946, and March 2nd 
or 3rd, 1946, Margaret Webb was in Salt Lake 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
38 
City with her brother Arlo, at the L. D. S. Hos-
pital, who was in a critical condition from injur-
ies sustained in an automobile wreck (tr. 81-83, 
Ex. Y, R). During that time she saw her hus-
band twice or three times and called him by 
phone several times (tr. 82-3). 
During this time Mrs. Webb asked for the 
license plates on the car of her husband, and did 
not get them (Ex. 3). Without current license 
plates she drove the car from Salt Lake City to 
Deseret. When- she arrived home she wrote the 
following letter to Wilmer Webb: 
March 5, 1946. 
DEAR TICK: 
rm sorry I 'didn't get a letter off yesterday, but we 
didn't come down here -until Monday morning. The 
house was so cold it seemed hours before it warmed up. 
How are you feeling today? I hope better. Please 
take care of yourself so you can soon come home. 
, I felt terrible about not getting up there to see you 
but I know my head just wasn't clear enough to find 
my way up there. As it was I had almost a straight 
shot to Highway 91 and I couldn't have found my way 
out any other way. 
Arlo had a hard chill just before I left and Mer-
win couldn't leave him, to bring me. 
I got home alright, didn't even see an officer. 
Tick, guess I forgot to tell you that Jack fixed the 
float in the tank, some time ago so the pump doesn't 
run so often. 
It isn't fair to you to have us here using your house 
and cream checks when you could use them so I will 
start looking around and see what arrangements I can 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
39 
make. Then you won't have so much to worry about. 
Things will be better, the sooner I can get away. If 
there is anything I can do for you, be sure and let me 
know . 
. . As soon as I get things arranged I will let you know. 
Follow the· doctors orders carefully and get well 
soon. 
Sincerely, 
MARGARET. 
(Ex. "Y," tr. 145) 
The envelope, Exhibit Y -1, shows said letter 
was mailed on the 5th day of March, 1946, to 
Wilmer Webb at his niece's residence where he 
was then staying. 
On or about the 8th day of March, 1946, Mar-
garet Webb wrote to her husband as follows: 
March 8, 1946 
DEAR TICK 
Just a few lines to let you know everything is fine 
down here, and hope you are feeling better by now, so 
you can soon come home. 
I can't pay the light bill until I take the cream to 
Delta and I can't take that until I get the license plate 
for the car. It makes no difference to me, if you want 
to keep them up there, I won't ask your folks to take it 
for me, they are doing enough. 
It wouldn't look very good for me to walk out on 
you while you are ill, so hurry and get well. 
MARGARET. 
P.S. I've had so much s - - - handed me the last 2 
years a little more from you won't hurt me any. 
MARGARET. 
(Ex. 3-tr. 83.) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
40 
On or before the 8th of March, 1946, he had 
entered the Holy Cross Hospital and thereupon 
his niece wrote the following letter to John 
(Johnny) Webb, one of the plaintiffs herein, at 
Deseret, Utah. It is as follows: 
JACK: 
S. L. C. Ut 
Mar. 8, 1946 
I'm up here to the hospital and as Tick 
can't write laying down I'll tell you what he 
wants. 
He said go to the secretary or the trunk 
and get the deed to the house and bring up so 
he can mortgage it to get some money for his 
hospital fee. He said he's almost certain its 
in the secretary. 
He said to see Dudley to see if everything 
is legal in it and where he has to sign. 
GLEN A. 
I'm getting Tick to sign it to so you'll know 
its him that wants it done. 
WILLM·ER WEBB. 
(Ex. "A," tr. 17) 
The plaintiff John M. Webb received said 
Exhibit "A" from the post office on the 9th 
of March, 1946. That day he fo1:thwith showed 
it to Dudley Crafts (tr. 139, 190, 208). That 
night he then took said Exhibit "A" to the home 
of Margaret Webb, and exhibited it to her ( tr. 
17, 139). ' 
At that time, March 9, 1946, he then told Mrs. 
Webb that Wilmer had gone to the hospital, that 
he and Spencer would go up to Salt Lake City 
the next day and find out what the condition of 
Wilmer was and what he needed (tr. 18), that 
he said he wanted to look for some checks and 
receipts as there was some question on some of 
the taxes on the partnership property and that 
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he couldn't locate them and he wanted to go look 
at them; that she turned on the light in the room 
where the writing desk was; that she then took 
care of the children; that when John Webb had 
finished he said something that he had found 
some papers that would take care of the tax 
notice, it was not the right receipt, but he had 
found some that he thought would do; that 
when he left he didn't show what papers he 
took (tr. 19-20). 
That on the same night, March 9, 1946, he 
took from the trunk of Wilmer Webb in the 
home of Wilmer Webb and Margaret Webb the 
War Savings Bonds he found there; that he lat-
er cashed the bonds and applied some of the 
money on the hospital expenses of his brother 
(tr. 139); that at the same time he also took 
some water certificates from the secreteary of 
Wilmer Webb and sent them to Salt Lake City 
(the water certificate here involved) (tr. 142); 
that at the same time he took from the desk or 
chest where Wilmer kept his deed and papers 
some papers and tax notices. ~These tax notices 
or papers he delivered to Dudley Crafts the next 
day. tr. 142-4). 
The next day or so (Mar. 10-13) J. M. Webb 
made that particular trip to Salt Lake City to 
see his brother Wilmer Webb who was in the 
Holy Cross Hospital and took with him Attor-
ney Dudley Crafts (tr. 128-9). He thought it 
was before Exhibit "A" was written; and it was 
before the ·deed, plaintiffs' Exhibit 1 was drawn. 
He returned from that trip before the 13th of 
March (tr. 246). 
On the 9th day of March, 1946, Spencer Webb 
heard about the Exhibit A of the defendant. 
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Spencer was also in Salt Lake City between 
about the lOth and 13th day of March, 1946, to 
see his brother Wilmer, and that he and Jack 
made the trip together-although he didn't re-
member definitely. they went together ( tr. 221-
2; 224). 
On the lOth day of March, 1946, Wilmer was 
expecting his brother Jack. On that date he 
wrote a letter to Margaret,-his wife. (Ex. E). 
It was posted on the afternoon of the 12th at 
Salt Lake City, and is as follows: 
DEAR MARGARET: 
Salt Lake City 
March 10, 1946 
I haven't sent the license plates. Because I have 
been here in the Hosp. about a week and the Plats are 
still up to Glena and she hasent came down to often. 
but I will send them down when Jack's comes back I 
think he will be up to day. Honey dont think that the 
reason I havent sent them was not to keep you from 
useing the car Please believe I have got to try and 
raise about $1000 to pay the Docteors I have 5 dif-
ferent Doctors and my Hosp. and my Blood transfushion 
they cost $25 each, and from what I can learn I have 
got quite a few yet I have taken 2 all ready Honey 
you said would do any thing to help me while I was 
up here. You can by at least staying till I can come 
home and can help me more by staying mutch longer, 
for I dont love any body else. But you and ever think 
I have said you know I didnt mean them · Please be-
lieve me If I loose you my world is all shot 
You said you were going to look around Honey 
Please don't until I get home. I shure would of like 
. to of had you come up. I was going to wright you a 
check but you didn't come up. 
I haven't been feeling so good to day and I am 
trying to write to you only wish I could be with you 
instead of writting to you. 
Honey hough is the kids all write I home and 
how or you by now. all write I hope. I just cant 
bring my self to geather so I guess I had better ring 
off for now. 
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I still love you so good night 
Willmer Webb, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 
Holy Cross Hosp. 
Ward 2, Room R. 
as ever, 
TICK. 
(Ex. "E," tr. 29) 
During the 14th day of March, 1946, Mar-
garet received the above letter at Deseret, 
Utah (tr. 28). On that day and on the morning 
of. the 15th of March she answered as follows: 
March 14, 1946. 
DEAR TICK: 
Received your letter today was glad to hear from 
you and hope you soon feel better. That is the only 
thing you should think about is getting well. Don't 
worry about anything down here we are getting along 
alright. I guess things can go along like this for a while 
longer at least until you are on your feet again and can 
take care of your self. 
The chickens were laying 12 and 13 eggs a day 
until I came up there and when I got back I only got 
6 and 7. It has taken me 10 days to get them laying 
right again. 
Aunt Cary was down again today to see how you 
were. 
I had a card from mother today. Arlo is still un-
conscious and very restless. They think they have the 
mengitis checked but said it might have gone to his 
brain. Doesn't seem like he has much of a chance. All 
we can do is hope I guess. 
I dug that old dead tree up the other day, it sure -
makes the place look different. 
Ruby and Melburn and La Mar were up there last 
Saturday. And Glenna is going up Friday with Avon's 
mother. I'll write mother tonight and let her know 
where you are. She was asking about you the other 
day. 
Afton has gone home now, so guess I better go up 
home Saturday and see if Cal and Dennis need any 
washing done. 
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The children are fine. Mary hangs around my 
neck so much its a wonder I can get anything done. 
Will write again soon and you write when you can 
and let us know how you are. 
Sincerely, 
MARGARET. 
(Ex. R, tr. 11'4 -) 
MORNING 
Did Jack Bring the license plates? He didn't say 
when he brought the milk, and I won't ask him. If he 
did he will probably bring them up later today. From 
the way he talked you won't be able to do much for 
quite a while. Do you think I can learn to milk, I don't 
like animals but guess I can make myself do it. I think 
I would rather than waiting all hours for him to bring 
the milk, and any way I can't find anything to say to 
him any more. I get more in the dumps all the time. 
MARGARET. 
Shortly after noon of the same day, the 14th 
of March, 1946, the plaintiffs met with Dudley 
Crafts in his office at Delta, Utah (tr. 224, 226, 
234, 238, 249). Mter discussing matters with 
Dudley Crafts a short time, J. M. Webb drew the 
following check: 
DELTA BRANCH BANK 97-147-12 
of Richfield Commercial & Savings Bank 
Delta, Utah, 3-14 1946, No. --
Pay to the order of: Cash $445.57 
Four Hundred forty five and 57 jOO - - DOLLARS 
WEBB BROS. 
by J. M. WEBB. 
(last check) (Ex. U) 
He then left the office of Mr. Crafts and 
went to the Delta Brank Bank and cashed said 
check (tr. 227,249-50, Ex. U last check attached). 
'There has never been any money in said Webb 
~Brothers account since then (Ex. I, Ex. U, tr. 
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250). On that same afternoon the 14th day of 
March, 1946, Defendant's Exhibit "F" was 
drawn tr. 250). It is in words and figures as 
follows: 
DELTA BRANCH BANK 97-147-12 
of Richfield Commercial & Savings Bank 
Delta, Utah, March 15, 1946, No-
Pay to the order of Margaret Webb - - - $500.00 
Five Hundred and no/100 - - - - DOLLARS 
J. M. & SPENCER WEBB, 
by J. M. WEBB. 
(Ex. F., tr. 250) 
An examination of this exhibit shows defin-
itely two different pens were used upon the 
some (tr. 251). And it appears to us that the 
writing of the body of it is very similar to the 
signature of Dudley Crafts upon the plaintiffs' 
Exhibit "I." 
On the morning of March 15, 1946, Dudley 
Crafts came to the home of Wilmer and Mar-
garet Webb between 10 and 11 o'clock a. m. He 
stated he represented Wilmer and Webb Broth-
ers. He remained about an hour. Mr. Crafts, 
herself, and her two youngest children were 
present. He asked if Mrs. Webb knew that Wil-
mer had come over to see him about a divorce. 
She told him she didn't; that Wilmer had spok-
en of going over, but he had never told her he 
had gone. Crafts said Wilmer needed some 
money for his hospital and doctor bills, that he 
said "they" wanted her to get a divorce, and 
wanted to know what she would take as a settle-
ment; that they didn't specify who "they" were, 
but she understood it was Webb Brothers; that 
she told him she didn't know what was a fair 
settlement. That he then told her most of the 
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farm properties were in the partnership and 
said that Wilmer didn't know how ill he was, 
and probably he wouldn't be able to work for a 
year, maybe a year and a half; that if "we" 
(Margaret and Wilmer) would sign this proper-
ty over to the brothers (plaintiffs) they would 
pay his hospital and doctor bills, then if such 
time came that he was able to work again, all he 
would have to do would be to repay the money. 
they had spent, and his property would be re-
turned to him; that the plaintiffs and Wilmer 
were in partnership; and that he figured Wil-
mer would get more value out of his property 
by letting the brothers have it, than by trying 
to sell it to an outside party. Mr. Crafts finally 
asked how $500 would be as a settlement. She 
didn't know what the $500 was to be for as she 
had refused to get the divorce, but had told him 
that if Tick wanted to get one that was a differ-
ent matter, but Tick had not told her that he 
did want a divorce. She did not remember an.y-
thing being mentioned about her statutory one-
third or her homestead rights. He also men-
tioned Mr. Webb had a 20-acre farm of his own 
south of town tr. 31-4). 
On cross-examination she testified that she 
was upset at Mr. Crafts' conversation in view of 
the letter from her husband of the day before, 
March 14, 1946 (tr. 57); that when Mr. Crafts 
came was the first she had ever met him; and 
that Crafts explained he represented Webb 
Brothers, Wilmer and his brothers too, and he 
had represented them for years (tr. 60-1); that 
Mr. Crafts wanted to know what she would take 
for settlement, that they wanted her to go and 
get a divorce; that she told him, "If Wilmer 
wants one, that is up to him," that "I don't 
want one;" that he (Crafts asked if I knew what 
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would be a fair settlement; and that she said 
she didn't have the least idea what a fair settle-
ment would be; that she received the $500 check 
from Mr. Crafts with the view Wilmer would 
have the money he needed to take care of him; 
that she '\Vas concerned over his health and wel-
fare; that she didn't cash the $500 check (tr. 
62-3); that she received the check and intended 
to go up and see Wilmer about it. She did tell 
Mr. Crafts she didn't think she and Wilmer 
could ever get along together as long as he was 
as touchy as he was." (tr. 64). Crafts said that 
when Wilmer was able to work again he would 
get it (his property) back again (tr. 66); that 
she thought the effect of the deed she signed 
was what Mr. Crafts said: "that if Wilmer was 
able to work his farm land again, Wilmer could 
repay the money and could have his land turned 
to him." (tr. 91, 66); that she did discuss 
with Mr. Crafts keeping possession of the car 
until after school was out and turning it to Wil-
mer, and live in the home until then, but the 
leaving was upon the question if Wilmer wanted 
her to leave (tr. 94-5). 
Dudley Crafts testified that sometime be-
fore noon, about 10 o'clock or later, on the 
morning of the 15th of March, 1946, he called at 
Mrs. Webb's home and .introduced himself; that 
he told Mrs. Webb that Wilmer had previously 
come to him about filing a suit for divorce, and 
explained his pra~tice; that he felt sure that if 
Wilmer had brought her into his office that he 
and she would have compromised their differ-
ences and gone back home and lived happily as 
man and wife; that Wilmer wanted to effect a 
reconciliation and go on livin'g as man and wife 
more than anything else in the world; that 
Crafts asked if she was willing to stay in the 
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house and care for him during his illness and let 
the domestic difficulties work themselves out 
(tr. 193-6); and that Mrs. Webb stated that un-
der the circumstances she was not willing to 
stay in the house and care for him during his ill-
ness and let the domestic difficulties work them-
selves out, that she had be~n hurt too deeply; 
that she didn't think t,hey could get along unless 
their feelings changed; that he asked her if she 
\Vas willing to get a divorce and that she said 
that she would not file a suit for divorce, but 
that she had made up her mind to pull out as 
soon as the present school term had ended. Mr. 
Crafts told her that Wilmer was greatly wor-
ried about money matters and that he had to get 
his property in shape for settlement of his obli-
gations; that he asked if she was willing to 
make a property settlement and then go ahead, 
file for a divorce, and that Wilmer would then 
know how much property he had left to make 
arrangements for his care during the remainder 
of his life; that she said a property settlement 
could be arranged; that she only wanted what 
she brought but she would not file for a divorce. 
Crafts said that Wilmer couldn't get a divorce, 
he was in the hospiteal flat on his back, "and 
we would have to make some arrangement 
that he had to have some money, and a com-
paratively large amount immediately.;" that he 
then told her that if she was not willing to stay 
there and take care of Willmer it was his desire 
to transfer the rest of the property to his broth-
ers, with the undertanding that they would take 
care of the obligations, doctor bills and hospital 
expenses and support and care for him during 
the remainder o£ his life; that she said she 
didn't want any of his property.- Mr. Crafts told 
her that if she executed that document she 
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'\vould be signing a'\vay -all her rights of every 
kind and nature in the property Wilmer had and 
that he didn't think she should do it without 
some consideration, ·without some counsel. She 
said she felt that he (Wilmer) should get all of 
his property to take care of him under his con-
dition. 1\ir. Crafts said that Wilmer would not 
be paying the money but it would be the broth-
ers. And she said if Wilmer would get the prop-
er care and attention while he was in Salt Lake 
she was willing to sign the deed and to take the 
check; that he told her that he thought $500 was 
a reasonable amount (tr. 192-6). 
Margaret took the stand and denied that she 
ever in substance and effect in that conversa-
tion. or at all, said to Mr. Crafts the following: 
That her feelings v1ere such that she and Wil-
mer couldn't get along; that her feelings were • 
changing toward her husband; that she had 
made up her mind to pull out as soon as school 
ended; that she would not under any circum-
stances stay longer when school was out; that 
she didn't want any of his property; that all 
she wanted '\Vas what she brought there; that 
what she wanted was to use the car until she 
could get a new location and get settled down. 
She also testified that Dudley Crafts did not in 
substance and effect ask her in said conversa-
tion whether she was willing to wait in the home 
and effect a reconciliation; but what he did ask 
was whether or not we could get along or not. 
She in substance answered that they had settled 
all their differences before he went to Salt Lake 
and that as far as she was concerned they had 
been reconciled ( tr. 256-258). 
Her husband did not make a full disclosure 
about his property to her; there was not a full 
or fair disclosure of the nature or value of the 
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home, his interest in the 500 acres of land and 
twenty acres besides, or the cattle or sheep; 
that he never told her how many or what the 
value was of the home, land, cattle, or sheep; 
and that she never made any inquiry about that 
during the marriage; that _when the deed was 
signed, she didn't discuss with Mr. Crafts 
whether the home was included; she had the im-
pression the partnership property was in the 
deed, but the home was not. ( 56-7). She was 
not familiar with the values of these items of 
personal property ( tr. 107). 
Dudley Crafts returned that afternoon, 
March 15, 1946, to the home of Margaret Webb 
just after school was out, about 4 :-oo o'clock p. 
m. ( tr. 35, 196). He met Mrs. Webb outside of 
her house as she was ready to leave for Holden. 
· He told her he had the deed prepared, and the 
check with him; and told her they wanted to 
take the paper to Salt Lake City and asked if 
she wouldn't take it across the street to the 
notary public and sign it. She- did so. When she 
returned Mr. Crafts signed as a witness on the 
fender of the car. The whole afternoon trans-
action took about three or four minutes ( tr. 36, 
67, 196-7). 
She did not express a willingness to Mr. 
Crafts to take the $500; that she took it with 
the view Wilmer would have the money he 
needed to take care of him; and that she was 
concerned over the health and welfare of Wil-
mer; that she didn't accept the $500 as long as 
she didn't cash it; that she didn't intend to use 
it until she talked with Wilmer; and that the 
same day she received the check she left to go 
see Wilmer (tr. 63-6). 
She drove to Holden that day (her mother's 
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home). When she got there she decided to go 
see Wilmer. She borrowed a tire. She bor-
rowed $10 from a lady to pay on expenses (tr. 
37). On the way to Salt Lake City she stopped 
at Nephi to see her attorney, Udell Jensen (tr. 
40-41). 
On the morning of the 18th she had a con-
versation with her husband about the deed. She 
asked him if he knew that the home was on the 
deed with the other property; asked him wheth-
er she should take the check ($500) and pay it 
on the home. Wilmer was still owing on it ( tr. 
37-39). He said that he didn't know whether 
the house was on the deed or not; and that he 
didn't know about them (plaintiffs) giving her 
this check, and he didn't know just what was 
going on.~ She told him that he didn't need the 
home while he was sick (in the hospital); but 
that he did need a home to come to (tr. 39). 
While Wilmer was in the Holy Cross hospital 
Mrs. Webb was advised that he would soon be 
able to get out a~d come home; that she had no 
idea he would pass away so quickly, that when 
she signed the deed she had the idea he might 
live for a number of years; and even as late as 
June she didn't know how serious he was. It 
was not until about June 15th that she was ad-
vised how serious Wilmer was (tr. 71). 
The yalue of the property of Wilmer Webb 
on or about the 15th day of March, 1946, was 
stipulated or admited by the parties to be as fol-
lows: 
Personal property specifically described 
in Plaintiffs' Exhibit "2" ------------------------------------ $3116.00 
One-third interest of Wilmer Webb in per-
sonal property described in paragraphs VII 
of administratrix's counterclaim and para-
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graph 4 D of Margaret Webb's counterclaim 
(total value $1430.) ------------------------------------------ 4 70.00 
Chevrolet car of Wilmer Webb______________________ 450.00 
One-third interest of Wilmer Webb in real es-
tate described in paragraph 4 B of Margaret 
Webb's counterclaim__________________________________________ 2460.00 
59 shares of water rights represented by certi-
ficate in Deseret Irrigation Co.________________________ 1000.00 
4 7 shares of water right in Delta Irrigation 
Co. -----------------------------------------------------------·----------- 1786.00 
Plaintiffs admit the value of the real prop-
erty, parcel A of the complaint, and first 
description of 4 A of the counterclaim of 
Margaret Webb__________________________________________________ 4000.00 
Against the latter plaintiff's counsel suggested 
a deduction of $910 because Wilmer Webb 
held title thereto in trust for his brothers and 
sisters named in the administratrix's counter-
claim ( tr. 135) 
Defendants claim the value to be $2000 or 
more than admitted by the plaintiffs ( tr. 
183-6). 
Plaintiffs admitted the value of second des-
cription in 4 A of Margaret Webb's count-
claim -----------·--------·----·-----------------------·------------·--- 550.00 
Total $13,382.00 
(tr. 133-36) 
The Court added to the first three items 
above $575.00 as the cash J. M. Webb received 
from the War :Savings Bonds taken from Wil-
mer's trunk, then added an additional $70.00 to 
the value of said items to make the total per-
sonalty $4671.00 (findings 15, 16). The Court 
found the above water certificates to be part of 
the value of the real estate but apparently de-
ducted the $910.00 suggested by Mr. Cline as the 
debt of trustees holding the title to said proper-
ty. Above omitted all additional value of $3000.00 
for the home place as testified to and offered by 
Mary Anderson (tr. 183-6). 
Mrs. Webb did not know anything about the 
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description of real estate. The first she ever 
saw description of real estate was on March 15, 
1946, and that she didn't understand them at 
all (tr. 40); that she was entirely inexperienced 
in farming or livestock operations, that this 
was the first time she was ever around a farm 
(tr. 53); that she didn't know that if she signed 
such a deed she would convey away whatever 
equity she had in the property (tr. 66). 
In September, 1946, was the first Margaret 
Webb ever learned the plaintiffs' Exhibit "2" 
existed ( tr. 40-41). 
Plaintiffs have never paid anything to Mar .. 
garet Webb or the estate of Wilmer Webb, e,x-
cept for the specific items mentioned in finding 
"19" above and the sum of $212 deposited to his 
account on April 8, 1946 (tr. 131). Plaintiffs 
maintain they are the owners of the property 
involved herein by virtue of said exhibits "1" 
and "2." They admit they did not pay Wilmer 
•anything for it; and maintain they owe the de-
fendants nothing for it (tr. 120-21, 237, 244). 
On plaintiffs claim to the car of Wilmer 
Webb the evidence is that the automobile de-
scribed in the complaint belonged to Wilmer; 
that he left the key for it with his wife to use; 
that when she went to Salt Lake in February, 
1946, she retained the possession of it until Aug-
ust, 1946, when the plaintiffs took it away by 
the sheriff, after the defendants had refused to 
deliver it to the plaintiffs; that the plaintiffs 
never paid anything for the car ( tr. 41-43). 
About February, 1946, when J. M._ Webb 
went to get the license plates for said car he 
took the title certificate out of it and kept it 
after that (tr. 142). At the request of Wilmer, 
J. M. Webb got the license plates for the car and · 
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gave them to Margaret. He did so when here-
turned from his trip to Salt Lake City and gave 
them to her. Plaintiffs contend by the signing 
of the papers the car belonged to them (tr. 42). 
Jack brought the license plates from Salt Lake 
City the night of the 14th of March, the day 
previous or the same day Mr. Crafts called ( tr. 
100). Title Certificate number 527371 issued to 
Jack Webb on April 30, 1946, on the car in ques-
tion was upon motion of defendants delivered to 
and impounded by the Court. It is the certifi-
cate issued in lieu of the one Jack Webb took 
from the car of the plaintiff ( tr. 150-51). 
On plaintiffs' claim to the water stock and 
the bonds the evidence is: Once or twice after 
the marriage of Wilmer and Margaret she had 
observed papers of value in his writing desk, 
and in his trunk said papers. Prior to the 
night that Jack went into said writing desk and 
trunk (March 9), she had observed water stock 
there and had seen some bonds in the trunk. 
Wilmer had made the statement before their 
marriage there was $1500.00 in War Savings 
Bonds there. Since Jack was there that night 
.(March 9) she has made search for said papers 
and no papers of value were left there after 
that. She did find Exhibits "B" and "C" among 
the papers after that. About Christmas time of 
1945 Wilmer took his water stock up to the bank 
at Delta to borrow money on it. That is the last _ 
she saw the water certificates. Exhibit "B" is 
an envelope on the face of which is a promissory 
note to the Delta Brank Bank of the Richfield 
Commercial and Savings Bank dated December 
3, 1945, on -which it appears he pledged certifi-
cate number 4409 representing fifty-eight 
shares of stock in Deseret Irrigation Company 
to secure the loan. It is marked paid "12-17-45." 
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Exhibit "C" is an envelope on the face of which 
is a promissory note to the same bank dated 
January 15, 1945, on which it appears he pledged 
certificate number 2853 representing forty-
seven shares of stock of Delta Canal Company. 
It is marked paid "2-5-45." After Wilmer's 
death she made search for these certificates and 
could not find them (tr. 20-2). Said exhibits 
with the security was returned to the maker 
thereon, Wilmer Webb, when the notes were 
paid ( tr. 78). 
On the night J. M. Webb showed Margaret 
Webb exhibit "A" (March 9 or 10) he took the 
war savings bonds from the trunk of Wilmer 
Webb. Later he cashed said bonds and de-
posited the cash therefrom in his own personal 
account; that he applied part of the money from 
said bonds upon the hospital expenses of Wil-
mer Webb; a11d that there were no other pay-
ments upon the hospital expenses or paid to Wil-
mer by either of the plaintiffs than those set out 
on Exhibit "CC," "W" to "W -8" inclusive, and 
$4.51 on telephone bills and $10.00 to Dr. Claw-
son (tr. 139-141). 
On the same night (March 9 or 10) J. M. 
Webb took from Wilmer Webb's secretary or 
trunk his ·water certificates, and sent them to 
Salt Lake City; and that he delivered the papers 
he obtained from the writing desk in Wilmer's 
home to Dudley Crafts (tr. 141-42, 144) . 
Each of the brothers had approximately the 
same number of shares of water represented by 
certificates of stock, and the water therefrom 
was used anywhere on any of their partnership 
or private lands-they were all throwed in to-
gether (tr. 145-47). 
Certficate No. 4475 representing 59 shares 
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of Deseret Irrigation Company stock which was 
issued March 23, 1946, in the name of plaintiffs 
herein was the certificate issued in lieu of the 
certificate which Jack took from the home of 
Wilmer the night of March 9. Certificate No. 
2963 representing 47 shares of stock of the 
Delta Canal Comp-any issued in the name of the 
plaintiffs on April 2, 1946, was the certficate 
issued in lieu of the other certificate previously 
owned by Wilmer. Said certificates were im-
pounded with the clerk of the above court 
awaiting the outcome of this appeal (tr. 152). 
After J: M. Webb took the title certficate to 
Wilmer's car, after he took the war savings 
bonds and water certificates, and after the 
plaintiffs came into possession of Exhibit "1" 
and "2" they paid the following items for and 
on behalf of the last illness, funeral and burial 
expenses of Wilmer Webb, to-wit_: 
4-8-46 Deposit to Wilmer Webb's account to 
cover Holy Cross Hospital and Doctor bills 
(tr. 130-31, X-1 and X-2) ···········------------------
6-5-46 Electric fan ........................................... . 
7-5-46 Dr. John M. Coletti, in full ----------------
7-5-46 Dr. Clawson, in fulL ............................. . 
7-5-46 Salt Lake Gen. Hosp. in fulL ......... . 
7-6-46 Tri-State Lumber, lumber and cement 
7-7-46 L. N. Nickle, Tick's burial expense ... . 
7-22-46 Hulda Dewsnup, cemetery ............... . 
7-27-46 Dr. Dave Moffett, phone calL ......... . 
8-8-46 Dr. M. M. Wintrobe, in fulL ............. . 
4-12-47 Willmer's head-stone ........................... . 
$ 212.00 
13.20 
115.00 
10.00 
545.05 
9.74 
425.95 
2.00 
8.95 
175.00 
112.00 
Total $1628.89 
(tr. 130-1, 126) 
(Ex. W to W -8 incl. and Ex. CC) 
The conveyances plaintiffs' Exhibit "1" and 
"2" left Wilmer Webb insolvent and unable to 
support or care for his wife, the children taken 
into his home and his widow after his death 
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(Ex. "G," L-1, tr. 100-102, 260-1). 
During the period of January 1946 until the 
death of Wilmer Webb the financial support 
given to the defendant was meager. The aver-
age which she received from January 1, 1946, to 
July 4, 1946, was about $10.00 per month (tr. 
259). In January, 1946, there was sale of pigs 
for 'over $200.00, she didn't know what hap-
pened to the money, she didn't get any of it. In 
February, 1946, she received two $5.00 checks 
(tr. 102-3). From March 1st to the 15th she re-
ceived nothing. From March 15, 1946, to July 
4, 1946, she received the following amounts from 
sale of cream which came from Wilmer's cows: 
March 21 ,--------------------------------------------·-···----- '$ 4.00 
March 28,---------------------------------------------------- 3. 74 
April (total)------------------------------------------------ 12.07 
May (total) -------------------------------------------------- 11.70 
June ------------------------------------------------------ 5.60 
July 1,------------------------------------------------------------ 1. 49 
July 27,---------------------------------------------------------- 2.94 
August 13,---------------------------------------------------- 2.59 
Total $44.13 
(tr. 100-102) 
From the time her husband went to Salt 
Lake City in February and for the next several 
months she and the children didn't have what 
they needed to eat; they had the same things all 
the time. February 28, 1946, to March 2, 1946, 
when in Salt Lake City with her brother she did 
not have any money for taxi fare (tr. 82). The 
reason why she didn't have any money was that 
on two or three occasions when she was in Salt 
Lake she asked her husband for money and he 
didn't give her any, although she tried to press 
the matter. She had credit at the store (in 
Deseret) but no prospect of paying for it. As 
long as Wilmer was living he didn't want her to 
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run any store bills and she respected his wishes 
(tr. 260-1). 
During the months of January to July 4, 
1946, the cost of Mrs. Webb and her children to 
live in the home was approximately $80.00 per 
month (tr. 258-9). 
During this period of time (February-July, 
1946) her folks would give her things to eat, and 
s01netimes they would give her a dollar or two 
when they could spare it. And one of the neigh-
bors sent her five pounds of flour when she was 
out and the store was out too ( tr. 102). 
PARTNERSHIP: 
The financial situation of the partnership of 
Webb Brothers has never been settled. After 
repeated demands of the plaintiffs to produce 
the records of said partnership, only fragmen-
tary accounts were produced (Ex. H, I, S, T, U, 
W, tr. 124). 
Exhibits "H" and "I" were the ledger sheets 
of the Richfield Commercial & Savings Bank of 
Webb Brothers from December 1, 1943, to 
March 14, 1946, which show the amounts of the 
checks drawn upon the account and the deposits 
made to the same, together with the dates there-
of. The business of Webb Brothers was to use 
this account as an operating account for the 
payment of operating expenses. Apparently the 
sales of the property of the partnership we:.;e 
often made for cash and cash deposited to the 
account (tr. 73-4). 
Exhibit "S" is twenty-six checks in different 
amounts dated from April 13, 1944, which is 
check number "1" to July 3, 1944, check number 
"27," together with the statement of the bank 
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which shows payment of said checks and two 
deposits totaling $4,899.91. Twenty-five of these 
checks were signed "Webb Bros. by J. M. 
Webb." One \Vas signed "Webb Bros. by Spen-
cer Webb." The notations on these checks show 
in part: "Payn1ent in full for 1944 payment on 
contract No. 43-5," "for cleaning of seed and 100 
new bag," "1944 payment on contract No. 43-6," 
"two canvas dams," "care of mother," "cement 
and lumber," "funeral expense," "funeral ex-
pense," 'labor on .hay fork," "parts of machin-
ery," "repair on truck and mower," "payment in 
full of con tract No. 43-5." 
The above checks were the checks which 
were outgoing from the partnership account 
(tr. 121). No other records of the partnership 
for that period were produced (tr. 122). 
Exhibit "T" is twenty-seven checks of vari-
ous amounts dated from April 13, 1944, to Oc-
tober 27, 1944, together with the bank statement 
of the Delta Brank of the Richfield Commercial 
& Savings Bank which connects with the state-
ment in Exhibit "S." These are the record of 
items of expenditures from the partnership for 
the period of July 3, 1944, to November 2, 1944. 
No others were produced (tr. 122). They are 
numbered from number "2" to number "47." 
Twenty-two of them are signed "Webb Bros. by 
J. M. Webb" and five are signed "Webb Bros. 
by Spencer Webb." Notations _on said checks in 
part are: "labor in hay," "for grave service," 
"milking," "for bolts for truck." "mower parts," 
"thresher parts," "for threshing machine." 
There is one deposit in the amount of $400. The 
last entry on said statement is November 2, 
1944. 
Exhibit "U" is eleven checks of varying 
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amounts dated from January 16, 1946, to March 
14, 1946, together with the statement of the Del-
ta Branch of the Richfield Commercial & Sav-
ings Bank which shows the record of payments 
of said checks by said bank. These are the rec-
ords of the expenditures of said partnership for 
said period. Ten of said checks are signed 
"Webb Bros. by J. M. Webb" and one is signed 
"Webb Bros. by Spencer Webb." In this group 
of checks one in the amount of $682.80 was miss-
ing and unaccounted for (tr. 122-3). Notations 
on said checks in part are: "for cement mixed," 
"truck coil-points," "1946 payment contract No. 
43-6," "truck license 1946," "8 lb. powder, labor 
spraying cattle," "home clippers, "cattle 1946 
grazing." 
Testimony showed that the item of March 
14, 1946, in amount of $445.57 was the last item 
of the "Webb Brothers Partnership" account; 
and on that day the Webb Brothers account was 
closed in the bank at Deseret; and that J. M. 
Webb was the one who personally closed the ac-
count (tr. 124-5). 
Exhibits "H" and "I" show they are the 
bank's records of the same items of deposits and 
withdrawals as are shown upon Exhibits "S," 
"T" and "U." In addition said "H" and "I" show 
that on and between November 9, 1944, and 
January 17, 1946, from said account there were 
withdrawn seventy-seven (77) separate items 
totaling approximately $3,665.50; and during 
said period there were six (6) deposits totaling 
$3587.83. The balance on hand at the beginning 
of the period was $99.39 and at the end of the 
period $21.72. Although repeated requests were 
made for the production of these records and 
accounts and the order was made to produce 
them, they were not produced. 
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J. M. Webb received the cancelled check and 
statements from the U. S. Post Office tr. 123). 
As far as he knew these statements and checks 
were laying around his house. J. M. Webb did 
not remember or tell the Court what the items 
of deposit were on the property which produced 
the income (tr. 121-4). He testified his best 
recollection was the deposit of $1448.05 on Feb-
ruary 8, 1946, came from the sale of cattle (tr. 
149). Probably said amount was from sale of 
partnership seed (check No. 59 of Exhibit DD). 
The $400.00 deposit item shown upon the 
back of Exhibit "H" and on the bottom of Ex-
hibit "T" under date of November 2, 1944, are 
the same item. Said $400.00 came from a per-
- .sonal note signed by J. M. Webb (tr. 75). 
Exhibit "J" is the record of the Delta Branch 
Bank of the Richfield Commercial & Savings 
Bank. It shows the opening of the account of J. 
M. or Spencer Webb of Deseret with the item of 
$500.00. It shows deposits of $377.07 on March 
19, 1946, and of $1625.25 on March 29, 1946. It 
shows substantial withdrawals during the latter 
part of March 1946. For this same period no 
checks, withdrawals, or deposits from the ac-
count. were produced, although demand was 
made for the same and the order of the Court 
entered to produce them. On the 29th day of 
March, 1946, there was an overdraft of $769.47 
which was taken care of the same day. It shows 
that on April 23, 1946, the account dropped to 
$464.35. When considered with Exhibit "K," 
"K-1," "K-2," and "K-3," the account remained 
below $500.00 until May 31, 1946. Said "K" ex-
hibits show the account below $500 during the 
following periods: 
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July 15, 1946, to November 12, 1946, during which time 
it went to nothing. 
December 11, 1946, to March 12, 1947, during which 
time there was an overdraft of $609.03. 
The amount of $445.57 partnership funds of 
Webb Brothers consisting of the plaintiffs and 
Wilmer Webb was placed in the partnership ac-
count of J. M. and Spencer Webb on March 15, 
1946, with other money to open the account in 
the amount of $500.00 (tr. 149, 230). It was this 
$500 which on that day was in the bank to cash 
the $500 check to Margaret Webb, if she pre-
sented it. The fourth item of deposit in this 
new account of J. M. and Spencer Webb was 
under date of June 3, 1946, in the amount of 
$422.92. (Ex. V) (tr. ). Said amount was 
received from Oasis Seed Plant by its check No: 
264 dated 6-1-46 payable to Webb Bros. in the 
sum of $422.91, which is Exhibit "BB." It came 
from seed crop of Webb Bros. during the fall of 
1946 tr. 235-6). · 
Exhibit "DD' is a group of checks from the 
Oasis Seed Plant to Webb Bros. as follows: 
Check No. 191 Endorsed 
4-13-44 ...... $ 4834.21 "Webb Bros. by J. M. Webb" 
Check No. 227 
5- 1-44______ 658.70 "Webb Bros. by J. M. Webb" 
Check No. 514 
3-29-45______ 2054.43 "Webb Bros. 
Check No. 606 
5-25-45______ 310.38 "Webb Bros. 
Check No. 952 
12-18-45______ 1000.00 "Webb Bros. by Willmer Webb" 
Check No. 59 
2- 7-46______ 1448.05 "Webb Bros. by Spencer Webb" 
Check No. 264 
6- 1-46______ 442.91 "Webb Bros. by Spencer Webb"· 
Total $11,728.68 
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Deposits on Exhibits "H" and "I" which cor-
respond with the above items are: 
4--13-44 ________________ $4241.21 short ____________ $793.00 
5- 2-4-4-________________ 658.70 
3-29-45________________ 1234.09 short____________ 82D.34 
5-25-4-5 ________________ none made short____________ 310.38 
12-20-45________________ 1000.00 
2- 7 -46________________ 1448.05 
No explanation is given by the surviving 
partners of these shortages. 
There were debts owing by the partnership 
of J ~ M., Wilmer and Spencer Webb on March 
15, 1946; and some of these have been paid out 
of the account of partnership of J. M. and Spen-
cer Webb (tr. 15415). 
There is a substantial conflict in the evi-
dence as to the number of the cattle and wheth-
er or not they were the cattle of the partnership. 
The public assessment records of Millard Coun-
ty on January 1, 1946, showed an assessment of 
ten horses, 95 cattle and 27 feeder cattle and 107 
head of sheep that were assessed to "Webb 
Brothers" as the "owner or possessor." The tax 
on these animals and the particular land upon 
which they were assessed was $152.04 and was 
to "Webb Bros." (tr. 116-18 . Said taxes were 
paid from the funds in the account of J. M. and 
Spencer Webb on November 23, 1946 .Ex."A-
A"). ·The recollection of J. M. Webb was there 
were between 90 and 100 head of cattle gathered 
in the fall of 1945; that they were cattle of 
Webb Brothers, Jack, Spencer and Walmer·, 1nd 
that Wilmer had about 13 head tr. 171). 
The recorded mark and brand was in the 
name of "Webb Bros." as is shown by exhibits 
"0" and "P." The brand was in three positions _ 
on the left side, which plaintiffs testified indi-
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cated separate ownership of the animals so 
branded. ( tr. 162-4). 
The animals of John, Spencer, and Wilmer 
ran together during the fall of 1945 and winter 
of '45-'46; and the partnership crops were fed to 
the animals (tr. 160, 164); and the witness, 
John, didn't know whether there were any sales 
of these animals during January, February, 
March, and April, 1946; that he didn't keep 
track of the sales, and that he didn't know a 
thing about it (tr. 165); and that from Novem-
ber 1945 to May 1946 he didn't remember wheth-
er there were any sales of the animals or not; 
that he didn't keep track of any sales during 
that time if there had been any (tr. 166). 
The sheep, about 100 head which were at 
Wilmer's in March, 1946, were put on the range 
and were back there again in the fall in her cor-
ral; concerning the three milch cows there was 
no change until after June, 1946, except the milk 
got a little less until August. 1946; and about 
September 1st John left a note and said if we'd 
come down we could get two quarts; that the 
heifers and cows are still at the place; that there 
were four weiner pigs there about March, 1946, 
and they were there until the fall of 1946 when 
they disappeared off the place (tr. 23-24, 49-50). 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS 
Come now the defendants Margaret Webb 
and M'argaret Webb as administratrix of the 
estate of Wilmer Webb, and upon the record 
and pursuant to the appeal taken herein, hereby 
jointly and severally state as errors committed 
by the Fifth District Court of Utah in and for 
Millard County, prior to the trial, at the trial of 
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said cause, subsequent thereto and in its find-
ings of fact, conclusions of law and decree, and 
upon \vhich statements the defendants and ap-
pellants jointly and severally rely for a rever-
sal of said decree and for a direction to the Dis-
trict Court to find in favor of the defendants 
and appellants herein and against the plaintiffs 
and respondents herein to vacate and set aside 
the findings of fact, conclusions of law and de-
cree excepted to, and to require the plaintiffs to 
make a partnership accounting to the adminis-
tratrix of Wilmer Webb's estate, as is more par-
ticularly set out, a.s follows: 
1. The Court erred in denying the defend-
ants' request for a jury trial of the causes set 
out in plaintiffs' complaint and upon the re-
plevin and conversion cause of the administra-
trix of said estate. 
2. The Court erred in excluding the offer of 
the testimony of the defendants' witness Mary 
A. Anderson, as follows: 
Q I ask you whether you are ready, able and willing 
to buy that home? 
MR. CLINE: Just a moment, your Honor, I ob-
ject to that as being incompetent and immaterial. 
I never have understood what a person is willing 
to pay tor a piece of property is any indication of its 
value MR. JENSEN: Usually the method is 
by experts. 
(Argument.) 
THE COURT : I believe the objection should be 
sustained. Will you read the question? 
(Question read) 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained. 
Q And I ask you whether or not you were in March of 
1946, able to have purchased that home. 
A Yes sir. 
MR. CLINE: I object to that as incompetent. 
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THE COURT: The objection is sustained. 
MR. JENSEN: Now, for the purpose of the re-
cord, may it show that Mrs. Mary A. Anderson is 
ready, able and willing to buy and pay for the 
description designated as follows: 
"Lots 3 and 4, Block 17, Plat "A", Deseret 
Survey, being part of Section 5, Township 18 
South, Range 7 West," 
being the former home of Wilmer Webb, in the 
sum of $7000? 
MR. CLINE: I think the record may show his 
offer to prove that. 
MR. JENSEN: We offer to prove by this witness, 
and the witness would testify as I have now stated, 
that she would so do. In other words, to make the 
record clear, we now offer to prove by the witness, 
if permitted to testify in answer to our question, 
that at this time she is ready, able and willing to 
pay for all of lots 3 and 4, Block 17, Deseret Town 
Survey, part of Section 5; Township 18 South, 
Range 7 West, Salt Lake Meridian, together with 
the improvements thereon and a marketable title 
the sum of $7000, and that as of March 15, 1946, 
she would have been and was ready, able and will-
ing to pay for that same home and improvements 
with marketable title the sum of .$6000. 
MR. CLINE: We resist the offer. I would like 
to include in our objection to the offer, that no 
proper foundation has been laid for the reception 
of such evidence. 
· THE COURT: The objection is sustained. 
3. The Court erred against Margaret Webb 
individually, and erred against her as adminis-
tratrix of the estate of Wilmer Webb, deceased, 
in admitting the following conversation over the 
objection of the defendants that as to Margaret 
·webb the conversation was hearsay, and that as 
to the administratrix of Wilmer's estate the 
witness was incompetent, the Court admitted 
the conversation in substance as follows: 
A conversation which was had between Dudley 
Crafts and Wilmer Webb, deceased, between the 
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lOth and 14th days of March, 1946, in the Holy 
Cross Hospit~l at Salt Lake City and out of the 
presence of Margaret Webb, the substance of 
which was that he was requested by Wilmer Webb 
to effect a reconciliation with his wife and that if 
that couldn't be done, to make what arrange-
ments should be made to take care of the expenses 
and take care of him for the rest of his life, and 
that Mr. Crafts suggested to Wilmer that if his 
wife would assume no responsibility along that 
line that Mr. Crafts see his brothers to see if they 
would not take care of Wilmer the rest of his life 
and pay the hospital expenses and doctor bills and 
take care of him as long as he lived and that he 
make a property settlement with them and that he 
convey all his property to his brothers "if he was 
willing to assume that responsibility". ( tr. 190-2) 
3a. That the Court erred in failing to grant 
the motion to strike said conversation for the 
reason that it pertained to a future agreement 
of support (incompetent and immaterial) and 
that said conversation was privileged as to the 
administratrix, which privilege the administra-
trix had not waived and that it was incompetent 
within the dead man's statute (tr. 190-192). 
3b. The Court erred in admitting Dudley 
Craft's testimony over the defendants' objec-
tions to a conversation had with Wilmer Webl;> 
at Salt Lake City some time after his conversa-
tion with Mrs. Webb (March 15), on the 
grounds that said conversation as to Margaret 
Webb was hearsay, incompetent, immaterial 
and irrevelant and upon the objection as to the 
administratrix of the estate of Wilmer Webb, 
it was incompetent as a conversation with a 
dead man, and that she would not waive the 
privilege of an administratrix as to conversa-
tions had between the decedent and his attor-
ney, which conversation was in substance as fol-
lows: 
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That he related the conversation which took place 
between himself and Margaret Webb substantially 
as he testified to it in court, that Wilmer asked 
what arrangements had been made with Jack and 
Spencer to take care of him and that he said that 
he had taken every precaution to see that Wilmer 
would be taken care of and that he had required 
the promise of the boys and got the promises of 
their wives as well that they would care for him, 
and that he did that after he came to the conclu-
sion that there was no possibility of Margaret 
Webb staying there (in the home) or ever being 
his wife, and that Wilmer had just as well make 
his mind up to forget it, as that was all there was 
to it ( tr. 200) . 
(d). That the Court erred in denying the 
motion of Margaret Webb individually to strike 
said conversation on the ground it was hearsay, 
incompetent, immaterial and irrevelant to her. 
And the Court erred in failing to strike said 
conversation as to the administratrix on the 
ground that it was incompetent under the dead 
man's statute and as to said administratrix it 
was incompetent, immaterial and irrevelant 
(tr. 200). 
4. The Court erred in admitting the testi-
mony of Dudley Crafts as to a conversation in 
his office on the afternoon of March 14; 1946, 
with the plaintiffs herein out of the presence of 
the defendant and over the objection of the de-
fendant Margaret Webb that the same was 
hearsay; incompetent, immaterial and irrele-
vant, and as to the administratrix that it was 
inc om peten t, purporting to be self -serving 
declarations, and that said conversation was in 
substance as follows: 
That Mr. Crafts ·told the plaintiffs that the condi-
tion of Wilmer was extremely serious, that some arrange-
ment would have to be made for his care, that Wilmer 
might live a number of months, or that he might live 
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a number of years, but no matter what happened, he 
never again would be able to work, it would be likely 
that he would be a helpless cripple the rest of his life 
and some financial arrangement would have to be made 
to care for him as long as he lived; that if was probably 
Wilmer's desire to convey to them all of his property 
with the definite promise on their part that they would 
pay all of his doctor bills, hospital expenses and other 
obligations and that they would support and care for 
him as long as he lived regardless of how long he lived 
or how serious his condition became; Mr. Crafts asked 
the plaintiffs if they were willing to assume the responsi-
bility of definitely caring for him as long as he lived and 
pay his bills regardless of how much it cost them. They 
said they were, and that they would do that; that they 
considered it their obligation. Mr. Crafts said that he 
had to have more than their promise, that he wanted 
them to talk it over with their wives and report back to 
him what they were willing to do after discussing it with 
their wives, but he told the plaintiffs their wives were the 
ones to say, they would have the responsibility of nurs-
ing him if he came out of the hospital back to Deseret. 
That the plaintiffs said that they would consult their 
wives regarding the situation, and that the plaintiffs 
came back late that afternoon, March 14, 1946, or the 
next morning and told Mr. Crafts they had consulted 
their wives; that Spencer's wife said she couldn't under-
take it because of the small children; that Jack's wife 
had said she was perfectly willing to take the· brother 
right into their home and nurse and care for him as 
long as he lived. And that after that conversation or 
about the time of Wilmer's death neither of the plain-
tiffs communicated with Mr. Crafts that they had 
changed their intention (to take care of Wilmer) . 
The last sentence was admitted over the 
same objection as above stated, with the follow-
ing objection, that it was calling for a conclu-
sion and a mere supposition (tr. 203-206). 
5. The Court erred in admitting the testi-
mony of Dudley Crafts as to a conversation in 
his office on March 15, 1946, with the plaintiffs 
herein, out of the presence of Margaret Webb 
and over the objection of the defendant Mar-
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garet Webb, that the same was hearsay, incom-
petent, immaterial and irrelevant, and as to the 
administratrix that it was incompetent, pur-
porting to. be self-serving declarations, and that 
said conversation affected the property rights 
of defendants, and was in substance as follows: 
That he told the plaintiffs that it had now been 
arranged where they were definitely to assume the re-
sponsibility of paying Wilmer's hospital bills and doctor 
bills, and that he (Wilmer) would now be ready to con-
vey to them all of his porperty, that Margaret Webb 
had joined in that conveyance, that it was now their 
responsibility during the rest of his life to see that he 
was properly taken care of; that he told the plaintiffs 
he knew they would do it. The plaintiffs said there 
wouldn't be any doubt, they would start immediately . 
and go to Salt Lake in the morning or the next day and 
try to make definite arrangements to pay his hospital 
and doctor bills arid expenses of that kind and that if he 
could come out of the hospital at that time they would 
make arrangements to take him right into Jack's home 
and take care of him. That Mr. Crafts told the plain-
tiffs that Mrs. Webb was to live in the home until school 
was out, that in addition she was to have the use of the 
car and that there were no license plates on it; she re-
quested the plates be put on; that Jack told Mr. Crafts 
that he would get the license plates and put them on 
the car so she would have the use of it and that Mr. 
Crafts told them about the arrangement to supply Mrs. 
Webb with Milk as they had done in the past, and that 
"he" said he would do it until after school was out ( tr. 
206-208). 
6. The Court erred in admitting the testi-
mony of Spencer Webb as to a conversation in 
the office of Dudley Crafts on the afternoon of 
March 14th, 1946, in the presence of J. M. Webb 
and out of the presence of Margaret Webb, that 
the same was hearsay as to the defendant Mar-
garet Webb individually, and that _it was incom-
petent, irrelevant and immaterial as to both de-
fendants and purported to be a self-serving 
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declaration, and that said conversation affected 
the property rights of the defendant, and was in 
substance as follows: 
Mr. Crafts said he had been to Salt Lake City and 
talked with the witness's brother, tha-t he (Wilmer) 
was in pretty bad shape; that something had to be done 
to meet his expenses at the hospital and doctor .bills, 
and Mr. Crafts asked the plaintiffs if they were willing 
to take on the responsibility of caring for him (Wilmer) 
and paying his hospital bills and doctor bills for the 
rest of his natural life if in return his property was 
deeded to the plaintiffs; that the plaintiffs told Mr. 
Crafts that they had worked together all their lives, 
that they wouldn't quit now; that they were willing to 
take the responsibility. Mr. Crafts asked if the plaintiffs 
would go home and talk to their wives and see if it was 
0. K. with them. That they did that. That the con-
versation- continued the next morning, March 15, 1946, 
in Mr. Crafts' office with the three persons present and 
Mr. Crafts told them that the papers, bills of sale, were 
fixed "these papers mentioned where we were to take 
over the expense of my brother" and that these papers 
were drawed up where we were supposed to take the 
responsibility for his property and to take care of him 
the rest of his natural life in consideration for the prop-
erty and upon the payment to her of $500 she was to 
sign a release of her interest in the real estate and per-
sonal property and she should be given permission to 
live in the home until school was out, and that the 
plaintiffs were supposed to put the license on the car 
so that she could have the use of that until school was 
out and for a few days after to locate a placB to move 
to; and that the plaintiffs gave Mr. Crafts the check 
for $500 and he gave the deed to the witness ( tr. 214-
216). 
7. The Court erred in admitting the testi-
mony of the plaintiff J. M. Webb as to a conver-
sation in Mr. Crafts' office on the afternoon of 
March 14th, 1946, in the presence of plain-
tiffs and out of the presence of the defend-
ants, that the same was hearsay as to the de-
fendant Margaret Webb individually, and that 
it was incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial 
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as to both defendants and purported to be a self-
serving declaration, and that said conversation 
affected the property rights of the defendants 
and was in substance as follows: 
tThat Mr. Crafts wanted to know if "we" 
were willing to take the responsibility of caring 
for Wilmer and take care of all his expenses and 
what not, and that if he should need medical 
care we should give. him this and take care of all 
the expenses while he was sick and thereafter, 
and that \Ve would take him and take care of 
him when he returned from Salt Lake; that Mr. 
Crafts suggested that somebody would have to 
take care of him (Wilmer) the rest of his nat-
ural life and that it was no more than right 
that we shDuld have the property for doing so 
in this respect. That Mr. Crafts, as he remem-
bered it, said he wanted something else a little 
more definite; that he suggested both Spencer 
and I talk it over with our wives, if it was 
agreeable to take him to the home when he came 
from Salt Lake City, he would probably be of no 
value so far as work. and that he would not be 
able to do any more work the rest of his life; 
that his back or his body was lacking in calcium 
and that he was unable to work any more and 
would probably be an invalid the rest of his life. 
Mr. Crafts asked us to ask our wives if they 
were willing to do that. That they did ask their 
wives, and that the next day, March 15, 1946, 
shortly after dinner plaintiffs and Mr. Crafts 
continued the conversation; that the wife (of 
the witness) _agreed to let him bring him there 
to the house and was willing to take care of him 
the best we could; that as he remembered 
(someone said) after Margaret left the house 
the plaintiffs were to move Wilmer to the house _ 
and go right there and take care of him in that 
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particular house, and that she ·was to move out 
right after school was out; that she was to have 
the use of the car and the home until then and 
the witness was supposed to furnish her milk in 
consideration of this, and the plaintiffs were 
supposed to have all of his (Wilmer's) property 
other than "we was to pay her this $500" ( tr. 
239-241) . 
. 8 'That the Court erred in making and en-
tering the following part of its finding number 
"5": 
"that some time prior to March 14th, 1946, the de-
fendant Margaret Webb knew that said Wilmer Webb 
was seriously ill, and on March 15th, 1946, when Mar-
garet Webb executed the deed hereinafter mentioned, 
she knew that he (Wilmer Webb) might be a perman-
ent invalid, and she had reason to believe that his illness 
might be fatal" 
in that said part is not supported by and is con-
trary to the great preponderance of the evi-
dence (tr. 31-4, 39, 66, 71, 81-3, 114, 145, Ex. 
"Y", "E", "R") . 
9. The Court erred in making and entering 
its finding of fact number six for the reason the 
same is not supported by and is contrary to the 
great preponderance of the evidence in that it 
was Wilmer Webb who tried to find a way to 
get a divorce. 
10. The Court erred in making and entering 
its finding of fact number "7" for the reason 
that the first paragraph therein is not sup-
ported by any competent evidence, but is based 
solely upon hearsay and incompetent evidence; 
and for the reason that the second paragraph 
thereof is not supported by and is contrary to 
the great preponderance of the evidence, and 
particularly that the evidence affirmatively 
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cer Webb met on the afternoon of the 14th day 
of March, 1946, in the office of Mr. Crafts at 
Delta and decided that all of the property should 
be transferred to the plainiffs; that on the basis 
of getting financial aid for Wilmer Webb for 
medical aid and hospital expenses they secured 
the signature of Margaret Webb to a deed and 
left a $500 check with her without any oppor-
tunity of Margaret Webb getting independent 
advice, and without being fully informed of her 
marital rights; and without knowing what the 
nature, kind and value of her husband's proper-
ty (Ex "Y" "A" "E'' "R" "I" "J" "F" "U" 
. . ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' tr. 250, 114, 30-37, 39-40, 65,71, 193-7, 222, 224, 
246, 139). 
11. The Court erred in making and entering 
its finding of fact number "8" for the reason 
that the same is not supported by and is con-
trary to the great preponderance of the evi-
dence, and particularly the part that she knew 
said deed covered the real estate described 
therein including the home of Wilmer Webb, 
and that she was not laboring under the belief 
that it was security for the moneys to be paid 
by the plaintiffs for the care of and for the hos-
pital and medical bills of Wilmer Webb, and 
that she had been fully informed by Mr. Crafts 
of the nature of the instrument. (Ex. "Y," "A," 
"U", "R"; tr. 17, 19-22, 36-41, 130-36, 45-6, 62-9, 
100-2, 142-4). 
12. That the Court erred in making and en-
tering its findings of fact numbers "9" and "10" 
for the reason that the same is not supported by 
and is contrary to the great preponderance of 
the evidence, and particularly the parts that she 
executed the deed and accepted the $500 check, 
that she was well informed of the kind, nature, 
extent and value of the property included in the 
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deed. (Ex. "Y," "A," "E," "U," "F," 
"G," tr. 40-41, 44-5, 56, 100-102, 133-36, 139, 142-4, 
160-1). 
13. The Court erred in making and entering 
its finding of fact number "12" for the reason 
that the same is not supported by and is con-
trary to the great preponderance of the evi-
dence, and particularly that part which finds 
Exhibit "2" was not executed with the intention 
of depriving Margaret Webb of her right to 
maintenance and suport; and that there is no 
competent evidence of any other transfer papers 
made by Wilmer Webb (Ex. "Y", "A"; tr. 9,17-
21, 30-40, 65-71, 100-102, 130-1, 259). 
14. That the Court erred in making and en-
tering its finding of fact number "13" for the 
reason that the same is not supported by and is 
contrary to the great preponderance of the com-
petent evidence introduced, and that there is no 
competent or substantial evidence of any valid 
consideration or contract for future support 
and maintenance of Wilmer Webb or to pay 
Margaret Webb $500 for her interest in the 
property;·and that no payment of·$500 was ever 
made to O! received by Margaret Webb (Ex. 
"A," "Y," "R," "U," "F"; tr. 31-40, 58-73, 190-92, 
200-10, 214-16, 238-41, ). 
15. The Court erred in making and entering 
its finding of fact number '14" for the reason 
that the same is not supported by and is con-
trary to the great preponderance of the evi-
dence; and that there is no competent evidence 
to support any agreement between Wilmer and 
th plaintiffs herein for future support and 
maintenance including medical and hospital ex-
penses (Ex. "A", "Y", "R", "U", "F", tr. 31-40, 
58-73, 190-92, 203-6, 214-16, 238-41). 
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16. The Court erred in making and enter-
ing that part of finding of fact number "15" ex-
cepted to, for the reason said portion is not sup-
ported by and is contrary to the great prepond-
erance of the evidence, and particularly in that 
the value of the water certificates were added 
to the value of the land and as to the adminis-
tratrix they are personalty, and the additional 
value of the home over the admitted value of 
$4000, to-wit: $3000 was excluded from the 
values of realty therein (tr .. 133-36, 183-87). 
17. The Court erred in making and entering 
its finding number "16" for the reason that the 
same is not suported by and is contrary to the 
great preponderance of the evidence, and par-
ticularly there was no evidence of any delivery 
of the War Savings Bonds, but the evidence 
clearly established a wrongful taking and con-
version of the same to the amount of $575.00 
(Ex. "A", tr. 20-1, 139, Finding 15); and fur-
ther there was no competent evidence of any 
agreement to deliver said bonds to the plaintiffs 
by Wilmer Webb. 
18. The Court erred in making and entering 
its finding number "17" for the reason that the 
same is not supported by and is contrary to the 
great preponderance of the evidence, and par-
ticularly that part which provides that the said 
deed and bill of sale were executed by Wilmer 
Webb and Margaret Webb for a good and valu-
able consideration (Ex. "A", "Y", "E", "R" 
tr. 17-21, 100-102, 130-1, 139, 203-6, 214-6, 259, 
238-41). 
19. That the Court erred in making and en-
tering its finding of fact number "18" for the 
reason that the same is not supported by the 
pleadings and is contrary to the great prepond-
erance of the evidence; and on the contrary, the 
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pleadings and the great preponderance of the 
evidence establish the following and the Court 
failed to find the following: 
(a) That on and between the 21st day of July 
1945, and the 4th day of July, 1946, the decedent, Wil-
mer ·E. \Vebb, was the owner of and together with his 
wife, during said time was in possession of the following 
described property in Millard County, Utah, to-wit: 
All of Lots 3 and 4, Block 17, Plat "A", Deseret Town 
Eurvey - being the home place of Wilmer and Mar-
garet Webb. 
which allegation was made in paragraph III of 
the administratrix's counterclaim and admitted 
in paragraph "4" of plaintiff's reply thereto (R. 
20, 27). The great preponderance of the evi-
dence establishes the same fact. (See refer-
ences to statements of error, 8 to 20 inclusive). 
b) That for many years prior to March 18, 1946, 
the plaintiffs and Wilmer Webb, deceased, were part-
ners in the farming and livestock business; and that at 
all times herein mentioned prior to March 18, 1946, said 
partnership was in possession of the following described 
property located in Millard County, Utah, to-wit: 
Lot 4, and the S.W. V4 of N.W. V4 of Sec. 4; lots 1 and 
2, the S. V2 of N.E. 1/4, the N.0 of S.E. V4, the S.W. 74 
of S.E. 74, and S.E. 1/4 of S. W. V4 of Sec. 5, Twp. 18 S., 
R. 6 W. S.L.M. 
The E. 0 of E. 1/2 of N.W. 1/4 of Sec. 8, Twp. 18 S. R. 
6 W. S.L.M. 
TheW. 0 of N.E. % of S.W. 74, and E. % of N.W. 74 
of S.W. 34 S.W. 34 Sec. 4, Twp 18 S.R. 7 W., S.L.M. 
that during said time the possession and use 
thereof was in the partnership, and the income 
therefrom belonged to the partnership, * * * * 
as is set out in paragraph "IV" of said counter-
claim and which allegations are admitted by 
paragraph "4" of the reply thereto (R. 21, 27). 
The great preponderance of the evidence estab-
lishes the same facts. Ex. H, I, S, T, U, V, W, 
AA, DD, tr. 121-5, 235-6). 
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(c) That on or about the 15th day of March, 
A. D. 1946, by the mutual consent of the plaintiffs and 
Wilmer Webb, said partnership herein referred to was 
disolved. 
which allegation was set out in paragraph "VII" 
of said counterclaim of said administratrix and 
admitted by paragraph "8" of the reply thereto 
(R. 22, 28); and which fact is established by 
Exhibits 1, 2, F, H, I, U, V). 
(d) That in addition to the income and the crops 
from the above described lands as part of the partner-
ship assets, said partnership on or about March 18, 1946, 
owned the following property: 
1 grain grinder hay rakes 
1 tractor 
1 threshing machine 
1 Chevrolet truck 
mowing machines 
wagons 
2 harnesses 
1 cement mixer 
1 manure spreader 
which allegation of paragraph "VII" of the ad-
ministratrix's counterclaeim was clearly estab-
lished by the testimony of Mrs. Webb, and not 
disputed by any evidence of the plaintiffs tr. 
51-2. 
(e) That the plaintiffs have collected large sums 
of money upwards of .$11,728.68, during the years of 
1944 to June 1, 1946 from sale of alfalfa seed, and that 
they received large sums of money from other sources 
which are not fully disclosed by the evidence; and that 
they have not accounted to the administratrix of the ex-
penditures of the same; and that although requested so 
to do have refused and still neglect and refuse to make 
any accounting to the administrtrix of Wilmer Webb's 
estate. (Ex. DD, H, I). · 
which are allegations of said counterclaim and 
are clearly established by Exhibits "H", "1", 
"BB". and "DD" and the testimony of all of the 
parties to this proceeding. (Said exhibits, par. 
IV, VII, of administratrix counterclaim and par. 
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4 and 8 of plaintiff's reply; tr. 51-2, 73-4, 121-5, 
149, 230, 235-6). 
(f) That Margaret Webb on the. 15th day of 
March, 1946, did not intend to waive her statutory one-
third right, title, and interest in the real property of 
Wilmer Webb; that Wilmer Webb and his attorney, 
Dudley Crafts, did not make to her a full and fair dis-
closure of the property of Wilmer Webb on said day; 
that she did not have any independent advice upon the 
execution of plaintiffs' Exhibit "1" until after the 15th 
day of March, 1946; and that said Margaret Webb did 
not intend to waive her homestead. 
(g) That Margaret Webb and Wilmer Webb, and 
each of them, executed· the plaintiffs' Exhibits "1" and 
"2" with the intention that the same should facilitate the 
accounting in the partnership of Webb Brothers, con-
sisting of the plaintiffs and Wilmer Webb; that Wilmer 
Webb did not intend to part with all his right, title, and 
- interest in said property; that said instruments were exe-
cuted as security for the repayment of his hospital and 
doctor expenses; and that said property was to have 
been his upon the return and the payment of the sums 
advanced, to-wit: $1628.89. 
(h) That the court failed to find that there was 
no evidence to support the transfer by Wilmer Webb to 
the plaintiffs of the following personal property: 
1. His 1938 Chevrolet Automobile 
2. His war savings bonds 
3. His certificates of water stock 
4. His hand tools and.personal belongings 
5. His 4 pigs 
for the reason that the same (f), (g), and (h) 
are established by the clear preponderance of 
the evidence (Ex. A, Y, R, F, 2, 3, and references 
under statements of error 8 to 17 incl.) 
20. That the Court erred in making and en-
tering its finding of fact number , for 
the reason that the same is not supported by 
and is contrary to the great preponderance of 
the evidence, and especially the portions there-
of that find the plaintiffs are· the owners of the 
property described in their complaint and the 
defendant, Margaret Webb, and the defendant, 
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Margaret Webb as administratrix of the estate 
of Wilmer Webb have no right, title, and inter-
est therein. (See all references above). 
21. That the Court erred in making and en-
tering that part of its findings of fact number 
"21" to the effect that there was no sufficient 
evidence to justify the taking of an account in 
this cause; for the reason the same is not sup-
ported by and is contrary to the great prepond-
erance of the evidence. (See partnership refer-
ences above). 
22. The Court erred in its conclusion of law 
number one, erred in its conclusion of law num-
ber two. erred in its conclusion of law number 
three, erred in its conclusion of law number 
four, erred in its conclusion of law number six, 
erred in its conclusion of law number seven, and 
erred in its conclusion of law number eight, and 
each and all of them, for the reason that each 
of said conclusions are contrary to law, based 
upon erroneous findings of fact and is against 
and contrary to the clear preponderance of evi-
dence. 
23. The Court erred in making and entering 
its decree in favor of the plaintiffs and against 
the defendants, and each of them, and the whole 
of said decree wherein it adjudges that the 
plaintiffs are the owners absolute in fee simple 
of the premises described in the plaintiffs' com-
plaint; and further erred in making and enter-
ing its decree in ·favor of the plaintiffs and 
against the defendants, and each of them, 
wherein it adjudges the plaintiffs are the own-
ers absolute of the personal property in the com-
plaint and therein described. Said Court erred 
in decreeing that the defendant, Margaret 
Webb, in her individual capacity and also in her 
capacity as administratrix of the estate of Wil-
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mer Webb take nothing by the separate coun-
terclaims, or either of them, except as stipu-
lated; and further erred therein in decreeing 
that the administratrix of Wilmer Webb's es-
tate was not entitled to an accounting in said 
proceeding. 
ARGUMENT 
The plaintiffs in this action claim to be the 
owners in fee simple or absolute of the property 
described in plaintiff's complaint under and by 
virtue of a "quit claim ·deed," "bill of sale," oral 
agreement, and performance of the same. The 
contents of the deed are as follows: 
"QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
"WILM·ER WEBB and MARGARET WEBB, his 
wife, Grantors of Deseret, County of Millard, State of 
Utah, hereby QUIT CLAIM to J. M. Webb and Spen-
cer- Webb, Grantees, of Deseret, Utah for the sum of 
Ten ($10.00) and noflOO ________________ Dollars, and other 
good and valuable consideration, the following describ-
ed tracts of land in Millard County, State of Utah: 
" (descriptions in complaint) 
Together with all water rights of whatsoever kind and 
nature, or howsoever evidenced, used for the irrigation 
of said lands, or any part thereof. 
"Witness the hands of said grantors, this 15th day 
of March, 1946. 
Signed in the presence of: 
Dudley Crafts /s/ Willmer Webb 
/s/ Mariaret Webb" 
(Acknowledgement was by Margaret Webb on March 
15, at Deseret and by Wilmer Webb at Salt Lake City 
on March 18, 1948.) 
The contents of the Bill of Sale are as fol-
lows: 
"BILL OF SALE 
"Know all men by these presents: That I, Wilmer 
Webb, of Deseret, Millard County, Utah, for value re-
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ceived, the receipt of which is hereby confes~- _ an9-_ 
acknowledged, do by these presents sell, assign, ~L 
J. M. Webb and Spencer Webb of Deseret, Utah the 
following personal property situated in the County of 
Millard, State of Utah: 
" (descriptions in complaint) 
"And all other livestock owned by me or in which I have 
an equity. 
"Also, all my right title and interest in all machinery 
and equipment of every kind, nature and description 
owned by Webb Brothers, heretofore consisting of my-
self and the said J. M. Webb and Spencer Webb .. 
"Dated this ................ day of March, 1946 . 
Witness: M. C. Yanhi /s/ Wilmer Webb" 
acknowledged in Salt Lake City March 18, 1948. 
The defendants maintain the plaintiffs are 
not the owners of the above property or any of 
it, except their interest in the partnership prop-
erty which is admitted. Defendants maintain 
Margaret Webb is the owner of a widow's 
one-third right, title, and interest in said 
estate; that the administratrix of Wilmer's 
estate is the owner of the balance of the 
property for Mrs. Webb, his sole heir, sub-
ject to the rights of the plaintiffs to be repaid 
the amount of expenses of last illness and fu-
neral expenses paid by them; and subject to 
their possession for the partnership of Webb 
Brothers of the partnership assets to wind up 
the business and make an account. Defendant 
administratrix maintains the plaintiffs must 
close up Webb Brothers partnership, make and 
account to her as such, and pay over the amount 
found due. She claims title to the property in-
volved herein is in plaintiffs as trustees for de-
fendant administratrix as the purported con-
tract for future support is sustained only by in-
competent evidence, and also the purported 
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transfer of the same as against the wife of Wil-
mer Webb is without consideration and a fraud 
on the rights A;o maiBteH:aH:eQ of a wife and 
widow. She also maintains she was a creditor 
of Wilmer for the right to a reasonable main-
tenance; and the conveyances were in fraud of 
rights. 
ASSIGNMENT NUMBER ONE: IN A LAW 
ACTION A PARTY IS ENTITLED TO A 
TRIAL BY JURY-
The plaintiffs' complaint was an action at 
law to quiet title to property and to oust the de-
fendant from possession of certain parts there-
of. The second cause of action set out in the 
counterclaim of the administratrix was an ac-
tion to recover for the administratrix the pos-
session of the personal property of the estate, 
and for that not returned to recover the value 
thereof as in an action for conversion. These 
are legal actions. Upon the determination of 
said causes, we mainteain the defendants were 
entitled to a trial by jury. Upon equitable is-
sues, we asked the jury be advisory to the Court. 
Within four days after this case was at issue, 
the defendants requested a jury trial and ten-
dered to the clerk of the court the fee. At the 
outset of the trial, the defendants excepted to 
the failure of the Court to grant a jury trial. 
"Where the issues are legal issues, the fact that 
equitable relief may be prayed for, * * * , 'is not suf-
ficient to deprive either party of his rights to have the 
legal issues submitted to a jury.' " 
State ex rei Hansen v. Hart, 26 U. 229; 72 P. 938, 
939, as affirmed in Petty et ux v. Clark et al, 
102 U. 186, 129 P. 2d 568 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
84 
ASSIGNMENT NUMBER TWO: EVIDENCE 
OF A BONA FIDE OFFER FOR PROPER-
'TY IS ADMISSIBLE ON THE QUESTION 
OF ITS VALUE-
The evidence here offered and rejected was 
a bonafide offer to buy the property which was 
not consumated because of the litigation. Here 
was Mary A. Anderson looking for a home, who 
had made inquiry for homes and the value 
thereof and was ready, willing and able to pay 
$7000.00 cash for the home place involved, yet 
the court found its value to be $4000.00. If the 
rule were so archiac or hide-bound to only re-
ceive the judgment of men, instead of realities, 
we'd certainly have hardening of the legal 
arteries. 
"It is said in some cases the bona fide offers to 
purchase land which the owner has declined are compe-
tent,***, while on the other hand such an offer does, 
****, involve an estimate that the land is worth at least 
as much as the amount offered, and is therefore relevant 
to show, on behalf of the owner, that the land is worth 
not less than such amount. 
22 C. J. 179 sec. 123 
"The offer of a price for property made in good faith 
and rejected by the owner is competent as evidence of 
value. 
German-American State Bank v. Spokane C. R. R. 
& Nav. Co. 95 Pac. 261 (Wash). 
Accordingly we submitted the Court erred in 
its findings as to the value of the real estate in-
volved herein to the extent the home place was 
worth $3000.00 more than found by the Court, 
and the rejection of the evidence in this respect 
was error. 
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ASSIGNMENTS THREE TO SEVEN: HEAR-
SAY CONVERSATIONS,ANDCONFIDEN-
TIAL CONVERSATIONS ARE NOT AD-
MISSIBLE OVER PROPER OBJECTIONS--
The Court in this case admitted testimony by 
three different witnesses as to four different 
conversations out of the presence of the defend-
ant, Margaret Webb, and admitted them to bind 
her. Two of these conversations ·were also out-
side of the presence of Wilmer Webb, and two 
purported to be with him, but outside the pres-
.ence of any other person who now lives than 
Dudley Crafts. These were likewise admitted 
over proper objections both against the defend-
ant administratrix and Mrs. Webb individually. 
Without these conversations in the record to 
bind Margaret Webb it appears to us there is no 
competent evidence to establish the considera-
tion claimed by plaintiffs. The same is true as 
to the administratrix. 
These were the conversations under which 
the Court adopted the view that a valid agree-
ment was made by and between Wilmer Webb 
on one side and the plaintiffs on the other that 
they would pay his doctor, hospital, and medical 
bills and also pay for or provide all his care and 
attention the remainder of his days. There is 
no writing in the record to sustain this claimed 
agreement; and .although Mr. Crafts testified 
he was hired to make sure this arrangement 
would be good and be carried out, yet he testi-
fied he prepared no such writing, nor did he 
take the signature of the plaintiffs, or anyone 
else to bind them to the terms of such an agree-
ment, or what the agreement was. 
At the outset it may be well to inquire of the 
record as to whose attorney Mr. Crafts was in 
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writing the· plaintiffs' Exhibits "1" and "2" and 
in getting Mrs. Webb's signature to Exhibit "1", 
the deed. Over our objection he testified he did 
not represent either of the plaintiffs, or them 
(tr. 199). He ought to know. It appears to us 
the record indicates otherwise. First, he said 
he saw the letter from Glena to J. M. Webb on 
the 9th day of March, 1946; that Jack brought 
it right up to him as soon as he had received it; 
that was during the day time in his office (tr. 
208) ; and that prior to March 14, 1946, when he 
told Jack he would like the plaintiffs to call at 
his office Jack had been in to see Mr. Crafts 
several times; that although he saw the. state-
ment in defendants' Exhibit "A" that Wilmer 
wanted .to make a mortgage for his hospital fee, 
he didn't prepare the mortgage ( tr. 209). Sec-
and, the result of the employment according to 
the plaintiffs is that they got all their brothers' 
property in exchange for a $500 check (not 
cashed) and payment of $1628.89 debts. Part of 
these debts were paid with money which came 
came from his bonds. Plaintiffs didn't change 
their homes or situation whaever to carry out 
this agreement to carry for their brother and 
didn't part with any of their assets until after 
their brother was dead and they had possession 
of all of the income property. 
In connection with the person whom Attor-
ney Dudley Crafts represented our Court has 
announced the rule: 
"The rule is general, with very few exceptions, that 
the declarations of an alleged agent made out of court 
are inadmissible to prove his agency, where the question 
of agency is material." 
Ephraim Willow Creek lrr. Co. et al. v. Olson 
etal. 70 U. 95; 258 P. 216. 
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But accepting the fact that Dudley Craft 
was only Wilmer·'s attorney, where does that 
leave us. May he disclose these conversations 
with his principal after the death of the princi-
pal and without the consent of the administra-
trix of the estate of said decedent? 
"A familiar rule of the common law forbids an 
attorney or counselor at law, unless his client consents, 
from disclosing communications which have been made 
by the client or advice which he may have given to the 
client. 
Jones on Evidence sec. 748, p. 1344-5. 
"In the absence of statute, the privilege is perman-
ent; it may be claimed by the client's ** administrator 
as against a stranger after the client's death." 
ib sec 750 p. 1350. 
Our statute 104-49-3 (2) U. C. A. '43 is to the 
same effect. Similar effect, Anderson v. Thom-
as, 108 U. 252, 159 P2d 142. In respect to this 
case it will be observed that Mr. Crafts was not 
asked by either of the grantors to be a witness 
and the evidence affirmatively shows he merely 
added his name after Mrs. Webb signed out of 
his presence. 
We submit there is nothing in the record to 
entitle the Court to admit these hearsay conver-
sations against Margaret Webb. The general 
rule should maintain " * * * , it is settled prac-
tice of courts to exclude hearsay evidence." 
Jones on Evidence p. 561 Civil Cases, 4th ed~ 
Our own Court has put the rule well in a similar 
case: 
Certain answers to questions involved surmise, 
hearsay and conclusions. The court did not err in not 
receiving them in evidence. Indeed, the court could 
not base any finding on such answers without indulging 
in speculation. The fact that the case was one in 
equity and required that the court 'hear all of the facts 
as claimed by each party in order to decide where the 
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equity lies', as stated by appellant's counsel, is no basis 
for the admission of incompetent evidence." 
Hansen v. Hansen, 110 U. 222, p. 225-6; 171 
P2d 392 
It is upon the above incompetent conversa-
tions the plaintiffs sought to show Margaret 
Webb had parted with her right to a widow's 
one-third, her homestead, and her right to the 
property described in plaintiffs' complaint, as 
well as the additional property described in de-
fendantes' counterclaeims. We submit the ad-
mission of said conversations were prejudicial 
error. 
ASSIGNMENTS EIGHT TO TWENTY, 
AND TWENTY-TWO TO TWENTY-THREE: 
FINDINGS OF FACT NOT SUPPORTED BY, 
BU,T CONjTRARY TO THE PREPONDER-
ANCE OF THE EVIDENCE, WILL IN 
EQUITY BE VACATED AND SET ASIDE; 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDG-
MENT BASED THEREON WILL BE RE-
VERSED. 
Did the representations of the defendants' 
exhibits "A", and "E", and the representations 
of Dudley Crafts to Mrs. Webb ring true? We 
submit they did not in the following particulars: 
First, the representations of Glena and Tick 
to Margaret through John Webb that he be 
given access to the valuable papers to get the 
deed to the house so Wilmer could mortgage it 
was not carried out, nor attempted to be carried 
out, but instead was used to get water certifi-
cates of value of $2786.00, war savings bonds of 
at least the value of $550.00, or a total of 
$3336.00 worth of valuable paper upon which 
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money could have been obtained immediately. 
The taking of said papers was unknown to Mar-
garet Webb, nor was said fact disclosed to her 
although Jack testified he took the papers to 
Dudley Crafts (tr. 144). Jack Webb said the 
\Yater certificates were sent to Salt Lake City. 
And between the 9th and the 14th day of March, 
1946, Jack and Spencer Webb went to Salt Lake 
City to see their brother and took Dudley Crafts 
with them to see Wilmer. Yet when Wilmer's 
letter dated March 10 and mailed March 12, 
1946, at Salt Lake City, arrived on the 14th it 
holds out to Mrs. Webb "Please believe I have 
got to try and raise about $1000 to pay the Doc-
tors I have 5 different Doctors and my Hosp. 
and my Blood transfusion get cost $25 each, and 
from what I can learn I have got quite a few 
yet." The next day Dudley Crafts stated to Mrs. 
Webb: "that Wilmer was greatly worried about 
money matters and that he had to get his prop-
erty in shape for settlement of his obligations" 
"we would have to make some arrangement 
that he had to have some money, and a compar-
atively large amount immediately." 
One statement made by Mr. Crafts (accord-
ing to him) was that Wilmer would not pay any 
part of the $500 to Mrs. Webb. When the ar-
rangement was made in his office to take the 
money from the Webb Brothers which included 
Wilmer on the 14th of March and offer it to her 
on the 15th of March, he knew or should have 
known his statement was not true. 
Second: A look at the record fails to show 
one creditor that demanded any money at that 
time, fails to show any request for money or any 
payment of any money on account of any of 
said represented demands at or near that time. 
Plaintiffs submitted nothing to support said 
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representations. The first statement defend-
ant found is dated April 4, 1946. Then on April 
8, 1946, the plaintiffs finally deposited $212.00 
to the account of Wilmer Webb to pay on his 
hospital bill, part of which money came from 
Wilmer's bonds. 
Third: The records show that by March 
23, 1946, the $1000 water certificate had been 
transferred to and issued in plaintiffs' names; 
that by April 2, 1946, the $17~6 water certificate 
had ben transferred to and issued in the name 
of the plaintiffs ;-that Wilmer's war bonds were 
cashed for at least $575.00 and part of it went 
to pay -on the hospital bills. 
Said representations of need for money by 
Wilmer Webb and his attorney were the pri-
mary means by which the signature of ·Mar-
garet Webb was obtained upon the deed. On 
the money representations we submit the 
great preponderance of evidence in said finan-
cial representations were not true. 
Up to the 18th day of March, 1946, Wilmer 
and his brothers were partners closely and con-
fidentially associated. But neither plaintiff 
disclosed anything of his or their dealings with 
the property or even invited Mrs. Webb to go 
to Salt Lake City to see Wilmer after he re-
ceived defendants' Exhibit "A" (tr. 245, 219-22). 
We have in the statement of facts pointed 
out those which show that Mrs. Webb was not 
advised of the property holdings, the value, na-
ture or extent thereof. So not only was she not 
?-dvised, but the information given was mislead-
Ing. 
"Where a wife did not kp.ow what property her 
husband had, and did not know the value of the same, 
a relinquishment by her of her one-third interest in his 
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real estate, given her by Revised Statutes 1898, sec-
tion 2862, in consideration of .$225, where the actual 
value of his real estate was .$7,000, was so inequitable 
as to render the transaction unenforceable." 
In Re Bell's Estate, 29 U. 1; 80 P. 615 
Re Cover's Estate 204 Pac. 583 (Calif.) 
The facts as testified to by Mr. Crafts are 
substantially as the facts in the following case, 
wherein the chief witness testified it was dis-
tinctly understood that the wife was to leave 
and from that time forward she was no more 
to be the decedent's· wife: 
"The agreement, therefore, being one calculated or 
intended to facilitate the securing of a divorce a vinculo 
matromonis, is contrary to the policy of the law and is 
void. The law is well settled that courts will refuse to 
enforce any contract, as against public policy, which is 
intended to promote the dissolution of the marriage 
status." 
Palmer et al v. Palmer, 26 U. 31; 72 P. 3 
In this case from the evidence, it appears 
there was a confidential relation between Wil-
mer Webb and his wife, Margaret. His letter 
professed the greatest of love and admiration 
for her as did the message by his attorney to 
her. Her letters and conduct showed a marked 
respect and steadfastness to him. She stayed at 
their home without the friendhip of the plain-
tiffs and without appreciable support for 
months, in accordance with his request to her. 
At his request-not hers-she signed the deed 
by which the plaintiffs seek to keep all. 
A fiduciary dealing with his principal is under duty 
to advise the latter to seek independent counsel when-
ever such counsel would be of .real assistance to the prin-
cipal in deciding whether to enter into the transaction. 
Peyton v. William C. Peyton Corp . 
.................... Del. .................... , 7 A. (2nd) 737 
syl. 3, 123 A.L.R. 1482 
Whenever independent advice is indispensable in 
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order to sustain a transaction between a fiduciary and 
his principal, it is not enough that the fiduciary urge 
his principal to obtain such advice, but the transaction 
will be avoidable, at the election of the principal, if 
such advice is not, in fact had. 
supra syl. 4 Peyton v. Peyton Corp. 
Yordi v. Yordi (1907) 91 P. 348 (Cal.) 
The rule holding one signing an instrument to be 
conclusively bound thereby is inapplicable to a transac-
tion prompted by a fiduciary with his principal, by 
which the latter, through contradictory and colorable 
expressions in the contract is swaged into a position of 
inconvenience and disadvant~,ge. 
Peyton v. Peyton Corp. syl. 16 supra 
One examines the conversation of Mr. Crafts 
with Wilmer Webb which occurred between the 
lOth and 13th of March, 1946, as testified to 
over defendants' objections, and it cannot be 
found therein that there was any direction to or 
authority given Crafts by Wilmer Webb to 
transfer his property to his brothers. That was 
the suggestion of Dudley Crafts to Wilmer 
Webb, to which suggestion there was no answer 
of Wilmer Webb. Pursuant to that conversa-
tion, Mr. Crafts said to Mrs. Webb: "That she 
knew and I knew Wilmer was extremely ill and 
he had requested me to come down there to 
please talk to her for the purpose of trying to 
effect a reconciliation, there wasn't anything in 
the world he wanted as much as to effect a re-
conciliation with her and go on living as man 
and wife." That was the purpose of his em-
ployment by his own statement. Did he follow 
the employment? or proceed beyond the scope 
thereof? 
Without any knowledge or information 
whatsoever to Mrs. Webb of any kind in the 
early afternoon after dinner on the 14th day 
of March, 1946, Attorney Crafts called the 
plaintiffs to his office in Delta. 
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The conversation didn't progress very long 
before John Webb and Spencer Webb agreed 
that the partnership should be immediately 
ended; that they would take the money of the 
partnership therein and place it in their own 
joint account. Accordingly John went to the 
-bank before two o'clock that afternoon, March 
14, 1946, and withdrew all of the partnership 
funds of Webb Brothers (Ex. "U"). From the 
hearsay incompetent conversation of said three 
all of them then knew Wilmer had an incurable 
disease; that his vertebrae was dissolving and 
going into the blood stream and he would be a 
helpless cripple the rest of his life and never 
again be able to do work (tr. 235, 204-7). Mr. 
Crafts said some financial arrangement would 
have to be made to care for him as long as he 
lived and 
"it was probably his desire to convey to them all of his 
property, transfer it to them, with the definite promise 
on their part that they would pay all of his doctor bills, 
hospital expense and other obligations, and that they 
would support and care for him as long as he lived, re-
gardless of how long he lived or how serious his con-
dition became". 
Mr. Crafts instructed them further to con-
sult their wives (tr. 204-7). At the same time 
they told Mr. Crafts they were willing to take a 
deed to afl of Wilmer's property and his person-
al holdings; and that without talking or consult-
ing Wilmer's wife about that matter. 
We submit that Mr. Crafts did not in his con-
versations with Mrs. Webb on the 15th day of 
March, 1946, make a full and fair disclosure of 
the nature, kind, and value of the property of 
Wilmer Webb, his situation, or his negotiations 
with the plaintiffs, and what he proposed to do 
with Wilmer Webb's property. 
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When Mr. Crafts returned that afternoon, 
March 15, 1946, and met Mrs. Webb outside of 
the house as she was about to leave, she merely 
examined the wording of the above deed and did 
not pay any attention to the descriptions there-
in. She knew nothing about descriptions. Her 
examination of the deed did note disclose that 
it was to be used as a basis for any care and 
maintenance of Wil~er Webb or to pay his ex-
penses of last illness and funeral expenses; and 
at that time, Mr. Crafts did not inform Wilmer's 
wife that a bill of sale would be taken upon 
practically all of the personal property of Wil-
mer Webb which the plaintiffs had not already 
taken into their possession. 
Mrs. Webb tried to follow that part of Mr. 
Crafts' advice to give the matter consideration 
and to get counsel. As soon as school was out 
she started for Holden, for her mother's place. 
But Mr. Crafts intervened and wanted the deed 
signed. Upon his urging the necessity of sign-
ing immediately, she did. But she still sought 
advice. First she had to borrow a tire, then find 
a woman who would loan her $10.00 so she could 
go to see her husband at Salt Lake hospital. 
Two or three days later, Mrs. Webb was on the 
way to see her husband at the hospital in Salt 
Lake City. She then consulted Udell R. Jensen, 
an attorney. She then continued on to Salt 
Lake to see her husband. 
On the 18th of March, 1946, she spent the 
day with her husband. She exhibited the $500.00 
check to him and talked to him about the deed; 
and her only answer was that he didn't know 
about whether the home was in the deed or not, 
and what was going on down there, and not to 
bother anything about the check, to go home· 
and await his return. She returned to her home 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Libra y.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
95 
and did as her husband suggested. 
The testimony of Margaret as to the sub-
stance of the conversation between herself and 
Attorney Crafts clearly shows her understand-
ing of the conversation with him was that she 
would be willing to do anything to see that Wil-
mer was adequately and properly taken care of; 
and that her intention \vas that she was signing 
the papers to the plaintiffs that they could bet-
ter run the partnership business; that the prop ... 
erty would be Wilmer's when he returned and 
paid off the amounts they paid to take care of 
him; and that she had no thought or intention 
that the conveyance \vas an absolute one or that 
she was giving up her widow's one-third in the 
event Wilmer passed away, which she did not 
contemplate at that time. 
It will be remembered that Mrs. Webb spent 
practically all of the day of the 18th of March, 
1946, with her husband in the hospital at Salt 
Lake City, Utah; that she cared for him during 
the day, fed him his lunch, asked him about the 
above deed, and exhibited to him the defend-
ants' Exhibit "F"-a $500.00 check. The plain-
tiffs testified that on that very day and after-
noon they saw Wilmer Webb and that he signed 
the deed; the bill of sale was admitted without 
any showing of the si_gnature or who was pres-
ent, but was undoubtedly signed at the same 
time. Wilmer Webb on that,day did not tell his 
wife that he had or was going to sign such a 
deed. He did not disclose to her that either of 
said instruments would be used as the basis of 
any asserted agreement for- Wilmer's care and 
support, and there is nothing in the record to 
disclose that at the time he signed the deed and 
bill of sale that he knew or that it was explained 
to him that they would be used for the transfer 
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of his property to his brothers and leave Mrs. 
Webb without any inheritance if Wilmer died; 
nor is there anything in the record that he in-
tended them to be so used. 
Sometime after the 15th of March, when 
Mr. Crafts again called to see Wilmer Webb, 
Wilmer did not know that said instruments 
were going to be used or claimed as a basis for 
such transfer and conveyance of his property to 
his brothers. From the hearsay incompetent 
conversation between Mr. Crafts and Mr. Webb 
after said instruments had been signed, it ap-
pears that Wilmer "wanted to know just exact-
ly what had occurred when I visited Margaret 
down there * * * . And then he wanted to know 
more about the arrangements that had been 
made \vith Jack and Spencer, to take care of 
him." The answer of Mr. Crafts was that he 
had "used every precaution I knew of to see 
that he would be properly taken care of I hadn't 
done it upon the promise of the boys alone, I 
knew they would do it, but I had consulted the 
boys' wives and got their promise as well, they 
promised they would care for him. I came to 
the conclu~ion, after talking with Margaret 
there was no posibility of her staying there, or 
ever being his wife, he just as well make up his 
mind to forget about it, that is all there was to 
it." The closing phrase "That is all there was 
to it" means to us that Mr. Crafts had convinc-
ingly and conclusively .so informed Mr. Wilmer 
Webb that there would be no reconciliation and 
that the arrangements which Mr. Crafts had 
made were going tp stand. 
It will be observed that the above conversa-
tion is entirely void of any agreement, consent 
or knowledge upon the part of Wilmer Webb 
that the arrangements made by Mr. Crafts were 
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satisfactory to him or were what he had auth-
orized or intended. 
Now what happened after that conversa-
tion? The testimony of the plaintiffs was to 
the effect that Spencer Webb could no.t assume 
to care for Wilmer if he came out of the hos-
pital. The testimony of J. M. Webb on cross-
examination was that he did not have facilities 
to care for vVilmer, but they had in mind taking 
Wilmer to his own home when Mrs. Webb va-
cated. There was no preparation made and 
nothing was done to care for Wilmer Webb in 
any way different or in addition to what the 
situation was before March 15, 1946. The rec-
ord discloses that on March 14, 1946, the plain-
tiffs and Mr. Crafts were advised that Wilmer's 
illness would be fatal, and the only reasonable 
inference from the same is that he would be 
cared for in the hospital where he was until his 
death. There were no payments of debts or ex-
penses, as has been pointed out, ~ntil after he 
death of Wilmer Webb. Accordinp)y, we sub-
mit upon the question of the consideration for 
the instruments: 
FIRST, there is no competent eviJence in the 
record to sustain any oral agreement that the 
plaintiffs would care for Wilmer Webb during 
the balance of his life or pay his hospital bills 
or expenses of last illness after he passed away. 
SECOND, that there is no substantial evi-
dence in the record that any agreement for care 
and support during the balance of Wilmer's life 
was authorized to be made by him or was made 
and entered into by him. 
THIRD, that the great preponderance of the 
evidence is that the arrangements made by At-
torney Crafts for execution of the instruments 
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was not upon a full or fair disclosure, and as to 
Mrs. Webb was ~ntirely inadequate. 
In theRe Cover's Estate below the settlement 
consideration was property of $14,000 value. 
The husband was worth about $200,000; and 
where tlie contract was entered in~o vithN>ut 
..tlle-failuFe fo¥ making the disclosure ~ 
.estate, or the rights which by such reement 
;she surrendered it was held the settlement was 
obtaind by presumptive undue influence; and 
the fact her husband was reputed to be a man 
of wealth did not impute to her knowledge of 
the value and character of his estate to excuse 
the failure for making the disclosure. 
"A husband in dealing with wife must act in good 
faith, and to avoid the presumption of undue influence 
emanating from the procurement of any advantage over 
her must make a full, and fair disclosure to her of all 
that she should know for her benefit and protection con-
cerning the nature and effect of the transaction, or must 
deal with her at arm's length, as he would with a 
stranger, advising her as to her rights in the premises. 
Re Cover's Estate, 204 Pac. _ 583, (Calif.) 
It will be remembered that Margaret Webb 
was not supported by Wilmer Webb during the 
last five months of his life and that $80.00 per 
month was the reasonable amount necessary to 
support his wife and family, so that at the time 
of signing exhibits "1" and "2" she was a pres-
ent and future creditor of Wilmer Webb and his 
estate for the maintenance of herself and her 
children which by now amounts to more than 
$1500.00. With the record of no payments made 
to her, or arrangements made for her suport it 
appears to us the bill of sale and deed were 
fraudulent as to her right of support and main-
tenance. 
We desire to call to the Court's attention the 
I 
I 
I 
' 
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reasoning of this Court in a recent fraudulent 
conveyance case which appears to be pertinent 
law \Vhen applied to the facts of this case. It 
was there considered that where there was no 
fair consideration given and where no actual 
change of position or any difference in the 
change of possession of the property was shown, 
the fact that there had been a deed and a bill of 
sale and a manipulation of funds was not suf-
ficient to avoid the same being a fraudulent 
conveyance, and the Court so held: 
"Bankruptcy.-In bankruptcy trustee's action to recov-
er land conveyed and personally sold by bankrupt to 
his wife on ground of fraud on his creditors, evidence 
warranted finding of lack of fair consideration for deed 
and bill of sale, so as to render them invalid, even if 
there was no actual fraudulent intent. Utah Code 1943, 
33-1-1 to 4." 
Cardon v. Harper et al, 106 U. 560; 151 P. 
(2d) 99 
"While there is some authority to the contrary, many 
courts have taken the view that the general rule requir-
ing judgment is abrogated by a statute which, as in the 
case of Uniform Fradulent Conveyance Act, sec. 1 
(U.C.A. '43, 33-1-1 to 4) defines a creditor as a person 
having any claim, whether matured or unmatured, liqui-
dated, absolute, fixed, or contingent, and defines the 
word 'debt' as including absolute, fixed, or contingent*-
**" 
Petty v. Petty et al 164 A.L.R. 520; 168 P (2d) 
818 (Ida.) 
In the above case, the right of a child to set 
aside a conveyance on the duty to support, was 
upheld. The same rule was announced as to 
the right of the wife in Murray v. Murray, 115 
Cal. 266; 47 P. 37; 37 L.R.A. 626, as annotated 
above. 
A similar rule is announced: 
"It is generally held that a wife, in respect of her right 
to maintenance or alimony, is within the protection of 
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statutes or the rule avoiding conveyances or transfers 
in fraud of creditors or other person to whom the maker 
is under legal liability. It seems this is so irrespective of 
whether the conveyance or transfer was made before 
and in anticipation of a suit by the wife for divorce, or 
for maintenance or alimony***" · 
26 Am. Jur. 815, sec 197 
That as between a husband and wife, her· 
right to be maintained from his property, es-
pecially if the husband views the situation that 
a divorce is pending, is well settled: 
"As in Fraud of Support~ Maintenance, or Alimony,-
It is gen_erally held that a wife, in respect of her right 
to maintenance or alimony, is within the protection of 
statutes or the rule avoiding conveyances or transfers 
in fraud of creditors or other persons to whom the maker 
is under legal liability." 
26 Am. Jur., Homestead, Sec. 197, p. 815 
On the question of whether the conveyance 
is fraudulent or not when connected with fu-
ture suport of the grantor, we observe the fol-
lowing: 
"Future Support.-Ordinarily, a transfer of property in 
consideration of future support is held to be invalid, at 
any rate, as to existing creditors whose rights are preju-
diced by such transfer. Thus, the transaction must be 
held to have been illegal where it appears that the trans-
ferer or grantor did not retain sufficient assets to pay 
his debts, as where he executed a conveyance of all his 
property." 
24 Am. Jur., Fraud and Deceit, Sec. 35, p. 193 
According to the ancient statutes .of fraud, I 
such an agreement is not a valuable considera- I 
tion: 
"An agreement on the part of 'the transferee to support I 
the transferrer during the lifetime of the latter is not, 
according to some authorities, a valuable consideration 
within the purview of the Statute of Elizabeth. Other J 
decisions hold that the transaction is sustainable against ) 
the transferrer's creditors." 1 
I 
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24 Am. Jur., Fraud and Deceit, Sec. 23, p. 182 
In this situation, there is no doubt that the 
health of the grantor was poor; that he was 
suffering from a serious ailment and knew it; 
and that his opportunity to deal was not good. 
Under those circumstances, the consideration is 
inadequate to support the conveyance: 
"The grantor, or those claiming under him, may show 
that under all the circumstances, and in view of the 
unnatural character of the transaction, and the value of 
the property conveyed, the agreement to support is so 
inadequate a consideration that a prima facie case of 
undue influence or fraud is thereby established; especial-
ly where the grantor was weak mentally and physically." 
Boardman v. Lorentzen, 52 L.R.A. (N.S.) p. 480 Anno. 
"In cases of postnuptial contracts, as in antenuptial con-
tracts, for the release of dower it is not enough that the 
husband granted property to the wife equal to or ex-
ceeding the value of her dower interest; it must be prov-
ed that the postnuptial agreements must be equitable 
and must be voluntarily made by the wife free from 
the influence of deceit or fraud. Hence the provision in 
lieu of dower must be adequate, fair, just, and equitable 
to the wife in every respect and it must be entered into 
with competent, independent advice and full knowledge 
of her interest in the estate and its approximate value. 
Such a· contract may be set aside by the wife on proof 
that she was influenced by fraud or deceit or on ~a 
showing of a lack of consideration." 
17 Am. Jur., 728, sec. 72 
"The presumption is that the contract is not fairly made 
when the wife agrees on the verge of her husband's 
death to take at his death property greatly less in value 
than her share as fixed by law where no contract is 
made." 
Redwine v. Redwine, 160 Ky. 282; 169 S. W. 
864 ib. p. 728 nt. 1 
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ASSIGNMEN\T NUMBER TWENTY-ONE:-
AN ACCOUNTING WILL BE ORDERED 
TO ADMINISTRATRIX OF DECEASED 
PARTNER'S ESTATE-
The pleadings in this case establish the fact 
that there was a partnership of the plaintiffs 
and Wilmer Webb; that they dissolved the part-
nership on or about the 18th day of March/146; 
and that the plaintiffs have not accounted t6 the 
administratrix of Wilmer Webb's estate. We 
have submitted much documentary evidence 
and there is much oral evidence adduced to es-
tablish that there never has been an accounting 
by and between Wilmer Webb and the plaintiff 
or the plaintiff ·and the administratrix of Wil-
mer's estate. We have requested that the Court 
order the plaintiffs to account as the records 
herein show they have come into possession of 
all of the personalty, realty, the cash, and the 
credits of Wilmer Webb, deceased, and are in 
possession of all of the records. No agreement 
or evidence was adduced to show why the ac-
counting should not be made. 
In this connection we call the Court's atten-
tion to the fact exhibits "1" and "2," the deed 
and bill of sale, do not purport to transfer Wil-
mer Webb's right to payment for said property, 
to his cash, water stock, bonds, accounts re-
ceivable, nor to his share in an accounting upon 
settlement of the partnership. 
The Court denied our request to an account-
ing. 
"The right to an account of his interest shall ac-
crue to any partner or his legal representative as against 
the winding-up partners or the surviving partnership or 
the persons or partnership contiquing the business, at 
the date of the dissolution in the absence of any agree-
ment to the contrary. 
69-1-40 U.C.A. '43. 
J 
~ 
I 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
103 
"Consequently, it is the duty of surviving partners 
to render an account of the performance of their trust 
to the personal representatives of the deceased partner, 
and to pay to them the share of such deceased member 
in the surplus of firm property, whether it consists of 
real or personal assets." 
40 Am. Jur. Partnership sec. 306, p. 342 
"In partner's action for accounting against execu-
tors of deceased partner, on proof that partnership exist-
ed, plaintiff would be entitled to accounting during its 
existence, even though exact dates of its inception and 
dissolution were not made certain." 
Kimball v. McCornick et al, 70 U. 189; 259 . 
P. 313 . 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the record herein submitted to 
this Court, we submit the defendants were de-
nied a most sacred right of trial by jury upon 
the law causes of action herein which involved 
the determination of whether there was con-
sideration for the transfers to the plaintiffs; 
that no substantial competent evidence was 
admitted herein to suport the claimed oral con-
tract of support and the performance thereof; 
and upon said issues the cause should be re-
versed. We further submit that upon the equit-
able counterclaims, the great preponderance of 
the evidence herein does not support the find-
ings of fact; that the findings of fact, conclu-
sion of law, and decree made and entered by the 
District Court herein from which this appeal is 
taken, should be vacated and set aside, and the 
District Court should be directed to make and 
enter its findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
and decree in favor of the defendants and 
against the plaintiffs upon the following equit-
able issues : 
(a) That the deed and bill of sale were 
executed as a matter of convenience in the wind-
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ing up of the partnership of Webb Brothers and 
as security for the return of the property upon 
payment of $1628.89 to the plaintiffs; that said · 
instruments be set aside and all of the property 
therein be determined to be the property of the 
Estate of Wilmer Webb, subject to said debt and 
administration thereof. That if this Court in 
equity should not so find, that in such event it 
should find: (b) That a full and fair disclosure 
of the status of Wilmer Webb's estate was not 
. madeto Margaret Webb; that she did not know 
the status thereof; and that she did not waive 
or intend to waive her widow's statutory one-
third right, title, and interest in the real estate 
of Wilmer Webb, and that she is entitled to her 
statuteory one-third interest therein and a 
homestead. (c) 'That it was fraudulent as 
to her right of support and maintenance 
from Wilmer Webb that all of his estate was in-
. eluded in said deed and bill of sale herein ; and 
that she is entitled to reasonable support from 
January, 1946, until date hereof out of the per-
sonal estate included in the bill of sale, and the 
real estate included in the deed. (d) That 
there is no evidence to support the finding of 
the Court that any transfer was made to the 
plaintiffs by .Wilmer Webb of the following: 
1. His 1938 Chevrolet automobile 
2. His war savings bonds 
3. His certificates of water stock 
4. His hand tools and personal belongings 
5. His 4 pigs 
And the Court should further find: 
That the defendant administratrix is en-
titled to an accounting of the partnreship of 
Webb Brothers consisting of plaintiffs and Wil-
mer Webb, and there up to order payment to 
) 
I 
-I 
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Margaret Webb, administratrix, the amount 
due. 
Dated this /,h' day of December, 1948. 
Respe~tfully submitted, 
' 94 
'R 
./ 
'\JENSEN & JEN ' N, 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
AppellantS.(~ \. ) j- j) ;; 1/ r;;.· ( fv;-~ 1/ r/'t.4-i--L--
Received copy this -- day of December, 
1948. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs. 
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